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I.  INTRODUCTION
It has  been  twenty-five  years  now since Ronald  Dworkin  began
his  efforts  to  redraw  the  map  of jurisprudential  debate'  by offer-
ing  a  "third  theory  of  law."'  When  Dworkin  published  his  first
important  articles,  a  traditional  and  polar  rivalry  dominated  the
field. Positivists equated  law with  the rules  recognized  as authorita-
tive  within  a particular  legal  system.'  This  association  of law with
rules led positivists,  besides treating  the existence  of law  as  a mat-
ter of fact, to  embrace  a gap  thesis. When  the  existing  rules failed
to  resolve  a  controverted  case,4  positivists  asserted  that judges  had
no  choice  but  to  fill  gaps  by  making  law  much  as  a  legislature
would.5
Rejecting  the  positivists'  identification  of  law  with  factually
existing  rules, 6 natural  law  theorists countered  that the  concept  of
law  necessarily  includes  a  moral  element:  a  rule,  however  aggres-
sively  it might  be  enforced,  could  not  truly  be  law  unless  it sat-
*  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  I  am  grateful  to a  number  of friends  and
colleagues  who  offered  helpful  comments  on  and  criticisms  of prior  drafts  of  this  Essay.
Particular  thanks  go  to  Charles  Fried,  Frank  Michelnan,  Arval  Morris,  Lew  Sargentich,
Fred  Schauer,  Cass  Sunstein,  Lloyd  Weinreb,  Don  Welch,  and  participants  at  workshops
at Harvard, Vanderbilt,  and  the  University  of Washington  Law  Schools. Work  was  support-
ed by  a  research  grant from  the  Harvard  Law  School.
1  Dworkin's  most  important  early  piece  was  The Model of Rules,  35  U.  CHI. L.  REV.
14  (1967).  His  distinctive  theory  most  clearly  emerged  in  Hard Cases, 88  HARV.  L.  REV.
1057  (1975),  and has  evolved  in  works  including  three  books:  TAING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY
(1977);  A  MATrER  OF  PRINCIPLE  (1985);  and  LAW'S  EMPIRE  (1986).
2  See John  Mackie,  The  Third Theory of Law,  7  PHIL.  &  PUB.  AFF.  3  (1977).
3  See,  e g.,  H.L.A.  HART,  THE  CONCEPT  OF  LAw  77-96  (1961).
4  See id. at  12,  121-32.
5  Se id. at 12,  132,  141.
6  This  formulation  does  not  do  full  justice  to  sophisticated  positivists,  such  as
H.L.A.  Hart,  who  recognized  that  law  must be  capable  of  supporting  an  "internal  point
of view"  that  differentiates  the  law's  claim  to obedience  from  that of  a  gunman,  see  id. at
55-56,  79-88,  and  that  as  a  matter  of "natural  necessity  ...minimum  forms  of protection
for  persons,  property,  and  promises  . . . are  . . . indispensable  features  of  municipal
law."  Id.  at  195.  For  Hart,  the  core  of  the  positivism  that  he  wishes  to  defend  against
natural  law  doctrines  is  that  "it  is  in  no  sense  a  necessary  truth  that  laws  [in  order  to
count  as  laws  must]  reproduce  or satisfy  certain  demands  of morality  . .."  Id. at  181.NOTRE  DAME LAW REVIEW
isfied  a  moral  test of acceptability. 7  This brand  of natural  law  the-
ory  stood in  an  uncertain  relationship  with  another version,  possi-
bly reflected  in Blackstone,  which  held  that law was not what legis-
latures  said  or judges  thought, but law  as  it ought to be.8  On  this
view,  the judicial  task  had  no  gap-filling  or  law-making  aspect,9
but was solely  one of discovering  the  law  as  it really was.
Through  its  various  iterations,  Dworkin's  third  theory  has
attempted  to bridge  the  gap  between  the  two  traditional  theories.
With  the  positivists,  Dworkin  has  accepted  that the  concept  of law
makes  sense  only  in  reference  to  going  legal  systems;  to  know
what the  law  is,  it is necessary  to begin  with  the  materials  that are
recognized  as  law  in  a  particular  culture."  Dworkin  leaves  room
to  accommodate  the  natural  law  view,"  however,  by  insisting  that
the  materials  that are  recognized  as  authoritative  within  any  legal
system-the  rules  and  standards  that  positivists  have  traditionally
regarded  as  exhaustive  of law-must  always  be  interpreted.  For
interpretation,  according  to Dworkin,  has  an irreducibly  moral  ele-
ment;  the  relevant  materials  must  be  interpreted  in  their  best
moral  light."  Dworkin  thus sides with  natural  law  theorists  in  rec-
ognizing  a  conceptual  link  between  law  and  morals.  Building  on
this  foundation,  he  has  further  asserted  that  legal  interpretation
necessarily  aspires  to  provide  a  moral  justification  for  the  law's
claim  to  obedience. 4  He  implies  that  a  regime  that  was  incapa-
ble  of generating  at  least  a  presumptive,  general  duty  to  obey  the
law would not count as  a properly  "legal"  system at all,  but only as
a scheme  of organized  coercion. 5
The  measure  of Dworkin's  influence  can  be found on all  sides
of contemporary jurisprudential  debate.  The  notion  that  law  is  an
interpretive  practice,  in which  legal  materials  must be  given mean-
ing  by  purposive  agents,  has  caught  on  with  a vengeance. 6  The
7  See,  e.g.,  MARTIN  P.  GOLDING,  PHILOSOPHY  OF LAw  30-33,  46-51  (1975)  (describing
natural  law  theories).
8  1 WiLLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENA.RIES.
9  See  id.  at  *69  (stating  that  the judicial  duty  is  not  to  "pronounce  a  new  law,  but
to  maintain  and  expound  the  old  one").
10  See  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 65-68,  87-88.
11  See Ronald  A.  Dworkin,  "Natural Law"  Revisited, 34  FLA.  L.  REV.  165  (1982).
12  See LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra  note  1,  at 52-53,  62-68,  254-58.
13  See  id  at  52-53,  90.
14  See id. at  139,  191.
15  See  id.  at  101-13,  190-91.  He  is,  nevertheless,  sensitive  to  the  relevance  of context
and  the  flexibility  of  language  in  making  sense  of  others'  seemingly  contrary  assertions
about when  law  and  legal  systems  exist.  See  id. at  87-113.
16  For a  critical  reaction,  see  Michael  S.  Moore,  The  Turn  to Interpretation:  A  Turn for
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idea  that  legal  decisions  must  be  morally justifiable  in  order  to
generate  an  obligation  to  obey  has  also  emerged  as  a  prominent
theme  in  constitutional  as well  as jurisprudential  scholarship.17
Although  strongly  influenced  by  Dworkin  myself," 8  I  argue  in
this  Essay  that  his  effort  to  develop  a  third  theory  of law  is,  ul-
timately,  less  an  unequivocal  success  than  a  deeply  instructive
failure.  Law's Empire, Dworkin's  most  recent  major work  and  the
text with which- I shall  be most concerned,  is  exemplary. Although
enormously  illuminating  in  the  depth  and  sweep  of  its  vision,
Law's Empire fails  in its attempt to synthesize  the  insights of positiv-
ism  and  natural  law  theories.  Too  much  is  lost  in  the  amalgam-
ation.
In this  Essay,  I argue  that the  traditional  opposition  of positiv-
ism  and  natural  law  better  exhibits  the  irreducibly  Janus-faced
character  of the concept  of law than  does Dworkin's  hybrid. I  also
attempt to show  that a type of positivist theory, which  Dworkin  has
labeled  "soft conventionalism,"  is  superior  to  his  own  as  a  theory
of law  and  that such  a  theory  can  incorporate  most  of Dworkin's
insights  into  the  nature  of adjudication  within  the distinctive  con-
text of the  American  legal  system.  :
II.  WHAT  IS  LAW?
Although  Dworkin  clearly  means  to  offer  a theory  of law,  his
slant on  the omnibus  question  "what is  law?"  differs  from  that  of
other  legal  philosophers.  Since  Dworkin  has  developed  his  theory
largely  in  opposition  to  the  positivist  theory  of  H.L.A.  Hart,19  it
may be useful  to  begin with a sketch  of Hart's  inquiry.
A.  Hart's Inquiry
H.L.A.  Hart's  The  Concept of Law attempts  to  answer  the  ques-
tion  "what is  law?"  largely  by propounding  a  theory  of the nature
of  a  "legal  system" 2 -- the  paradigmatic  context  in  which  law,  as
thm  Worse?, 41  STAN.  L.  Rnv.  871  (1989).
17  See  Paul  W.  Kahn,  Community  in  Contemporary Constitutional Theory,  99  YALE  L.J.  1
(1989).
18  See,  e.g.,  Richard  H.  Fallon,  Jr.,  A  Constructivist  Coherence  Theory  of  Constitutional
Interpretation, 100  HARV.  L.  REV.  1189,  1233-37  (1987).
19  Dworkin,  in  The Model  of Rules,  supra note  1,  explicitly  attacked  Hart's  theory,  as
elaborated  in  THE  CONCEPT  OF  LAW,  supra note  3,  and  he  has kept  up' the  attack in  his
subsequent  writings.  See, e.g.,  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 33-44.
20  See  HART,  supra note 3,  at  16-17,  111-14.
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an  instrument  of  social  control,  is  exhibited."  According  to
Hart's  classic  formulation,  law  (or  more  properly,  I  think,  a legal
system)22  is  a  union  of  primary  and  secondary  "rules." 23  Within
this  typology, primary  rules regulate  the conduct of the  population
as  a  whole;  secondary  rules,  including a so-called  "rule of recogni-
tion"  that  identifies  what  counts  as  law  within  the jurisdiction,
2 4
define  the powers  of law-making  and  law-enforcing  officials.25
Hart  constructs  his  analysis  around  the  concept  of  a  social
rule, which  must  be  understood  from  both  an  internal  and  an
external  point  of  view. 6   From  an  external  point  of
view-roughly,  that of an observing  anthropologist-a  social  rule is
a  standard  of conduct  that  is  generally  complied  with  and  devia-
tion  from  which  typically  engenders  criticism.  From  an  internal
point of view-that  of an unalienated  participant in  the  social life
of the community-a  social  rule  is a standard that is  accepted  as  a
guide  to  conduct  and  a  basis  for  criticism,  including  self-criti-
cism.
Reliance  on the  concept of a rule allows  Hart to  pursue sever-
al  tasks  simultaneously. First,  the concept  explains  the  operation  of
law  in  ordinary  social  life:  basic  legal  standards  tend  to  be  well-
known,  and  departures  from  them  are  typically  regarded  as  occa-
sions  for  criticism  or  self-criticism,  if not  official  coercion.2 9  Sec-
ond, Hart hopes to  account for the  phenomenon  of legal  change:
"power-conferring"  rules  authorize  the  creation  of  new  rules  by
designated  officials. 3  Third,  he  aims  to  explain  the  nature  of ad-
21  Cf  JOSEPH  RAZ,  THE  CONCEPT  OF  A  LEGAL  SYSTEM  169-70  (2d  ed.  1980)  ("The
analysis  of the  concept  of a  law  depends  on  the  analysis  of  the  concept  of  a  legal  sys-
tem.").
22  See  HART,  supra note  3,  at  111-14.
23  See  id at  91-96.
24  See  id.  at 92.
25  See  id. at  91-96.  Somewhat  confusingly,  Hart  also  uses  the  term  "secondary  rule"
to  encompass  all  power-conferring  rules,  a  category  within  which  lie  also  locates  rules
specifying  the  acceptable  forms  of private  creation  of legal  obligations  through,  for exam-
pie,  the  drafting  of wills  and  the  making  of contracts.  See id.  at  78-79.
26  See id.  at  54-60.
27  See id.  at  54-60,  86-88.
28  See id.
29  See  id.  at  39.
The  principal  functions  of  the  law  as  a  means  of  social  control  are  not  to  be
seen  in  private  litigation  or  prosecutions,  which  represent  vital  but still  ancillary
provisions  for  the  failures  of  the  system.  It  is  to  be  seen  in the  diverse  ways  in
which  law  is  used  to  control,  to  guide,  and  to  plan  life  out  of court.
Id.
30  See  id.  at 35-43,  93-94.
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judication:  judges  typically  apply  the  law,  but  are  authorized  by
power-conferring  rules  to  fill  gaps  and  possibly  to  effect  other
changes."'  Fourth,  and  most  generally,  by  beginning  with  the
concept  of a  social  rule, Hart  emphasizes  that law  is  a  phenome-
non  grounded  in  shared  standards  of  appropriate  conduct  and
socially enforced  pressure  to conform.3 2
In  contrast  with  Dworkin,  however,  Hart's  rule-based  analysis
reflects  much less concern  with  the procedure  for identifying  "the
law"  in any  particular disputed  case than with  explicating  the  con-
cept  of  "law"  generally. 33  Insofar  as  the  "Hart-Dworkin  debate"  is
worth judging  in  its  own  terms,'  a  central  question  is  whether
Hart's  angle  of vision-which  links  the  concept  of  law  closely  to
that of a  legal  system  and accounts  for  the nature  of a  legal  sys-
tem in terms  of rule-based  foundations  in social fact-is an  illumi-
nating  one.
B.  Dworkin's Focus
In  contrast with  Hart's  focus  on  the  nature  of a  legal  system
and  the  ways  in which  a  legal  system  characteristically  guides  con-
duct and  furnishes  mechanisms  for  lawmaking  and  legal  change,
Dworkin  develops  his  theory  of law  by  asking  how judges  actually
do,  or  should, decide  "hard cases."  When  faced  with a  case  hav-
ing  no  conventionally  accepted  resolution, 6 judges,  according  to
31  S&e  id. at  121-50.
32  Hart  allows  at  least  the  possibility  that,  in  an  advanced  legal  system,  the  mass  of
the  general  population  need  not accept primary  rules  as  standards  for  criticism  and self-
criticism.  It  is  enough  if they  generally obey  the  law, whatever  their attitude  toward  it.  See
id.  at  59-60,  113.  The  system's  officials,  by  contrast,  must generally  "accept" the  rule  of
recognition-the  fundamental  rule  specifying  how  other  legal  rules  are  to  be  identi-
fied-in  the  sense  of  taking  it  as  a  "common  standard[]  of  official  behavior  and
apprais[ing]  critically  their  own  and  each  other's  deviations  as  lapses."  Id.  at  113.  As  a
result,  law  is  always  rooted  in  the  facts  of social  practice,  even  if only  that  of the  officials
who  (for there  to  be a  legal  system at all)  must accept  the  rule  of recognition,  both  the
existence  and  the  content  of which  are  irreducible  matters  of fact.
33  As I  have  suggested,  Hart  attempts  to  achieve  explication  less  by addressing  forms
of  the  question  "what is  the  law?"  than  by  elucidating  the  context  in  which  the  question
is  likely  to  arise:  that  of a  legal  system.  Indeed,  Hart's  account  of  law  as  a  union  of
primary  and  secondary  rules  (see  HART,  supra note  3,  at 91,  96)  works  much  better  as  a
sketch  of the  nature  of  a  legal  system  than  it  does  as  a  definition  of "law"-a  concept
that permits  a  host of usages.
34  For  critical  comparisons  and  contrasts,  see  E.  Philip  Soper,  Legal  Theoiy  and the
Obigation of  a  Judge: Te Hart-Dwordn Dispute, 75  MICH.  L. REv.  473  (1977);  Lloyd  L.
Weinreb,  Law  as Order, 91  HARV.  L.  REV.  909  (1978).
35  &e,  eg,  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1, at  10, 128-29,  255-56,  265-66,  411;  Hard Cas-
es, supra note  1.
36  The  absence  of a  conventionally  accepted  or acceptable  resolution  may  be  attrib-
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Dworkin,  do  not  simply  proceed  on  the  model  of a  deputy  legis-
lature  Instead,  Dworkin  argues, judges  seek  to  "interpret" what
they take  to be  the  relevant  legal  authorities  and  to  discern  what
result  the  relevant  authorities,  when  properly  interpreted,  dic-
tate.
3 8
As  portrayed  by  Dworkin,  the  required  interpretation  turns
out  to  be  an  endless,  "creative," 9  and  thoroughly  "protestant'
activity.  Before  engaging  in  legal  interpretation,  anyone  must  first
develop  a  complex  theory  of  "the  point"  of law  and  legal  prac-
tice.41  A  would-be  legal  practitioner  must  determine  why  law  ex-
ists,  why  people  engage  in  legal  interpretation  at  all,  and  what
interpretive  standards  must  be  observed  if  the  point  of  law  and
legal  practice  is  to  be  realized.  Dworkin  suggests  that a  practitio-
ner  must begin  with  a  "preinterpretive  sense"  of what  is  generally
done  and  accepted  by  those  who  engage  in  legal  argument  and
decisionmaking.42  Then,  treating  generally  accepted  norms  as
provisional  fixed  points  that  any  competent  theory  must
encompass,  the  practitioner  must  take  the  "interpretive"  step  of
"try[ing]  to impose  meaning on  the  [practice]-to  see  it in its best
light-and  then  to  restructure  it in  light  of that  meaning. '  Fi-
nally,  having  done  this,  the  practitioner  must  interpret  particular
authorities  in  the  way  that  the  aims  of the  practice  require-one
that  makes  both  the  general  legal  practice  of the  community and
its  resolutions  of  particular  controversies  the  best  that  they  can
plausibly  be  portrayed  as  being.44  Different  people  will  reach  dif-
ferent interpretive judgments,  partly because  they will  differ about
how  best to  strike  the balance  between  "fit" and  normative  attrac-
tiveness45  and  'partly because  they  will  disagree  about  what  is  mor-
ally  and  politically  right.4 6
utable  either  to  the  vagueness  or  ambiguity  of relevant  authorities  or  to  the  morally  or
socially  problematic  consequences  of  applying  an  otherwise  applicable  rule  or  standard.
See  FREDERICK  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE RULES:  A  PHILOSOPHICAL  EXAMINATION  OF  RULE-
BASED  DECISION-MAKING  IN  LAW  AND  IN  LIFE  209-10  (1991).
37  See,  eg.,  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  254-56.
38  See Hard Cases,  supra note  1.
39  See  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  50-53.
40  Id.  at  190,  413.
41  See id.  at  52-53,  58-59.
42  See  id-  at  65-67.
43  I&  at  47.
44  See  id- at 52-53,  98-99,  255-56.
45  See  i&  at 254-58.
46  See  id.  at  254-60.  Dispute  notwithstanding,  Dworkin  maintains  that  there  is  "one
right  answer"  to  legal  questions  determined  largely  by  standards  of  ultimate  moral  right.
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The  conceptual  connection  between  law  and  morals  also .dic-
tates  what  Dworkin  calls  "interpretive  protestantism. ', 7  The  ques-
tion (of what  is  morally  right cannot  be  answered  by  appealing  to
social  fact  or  settled  legal  authority.  Each judge  and  legal  inter-
preter  must  decide  for  herself,  paying  attention  to  the  views  of
others  only  insofar  as  they  can  be  regarded  as  reliable  guides  to
moral  and political  truth."
C.  The Costs of Dworkin's Approach
As a  theory of adjudication  in  the English  and American  con-
texts,  Dworkin's  theory  is,  at  least,  challenging  and  provocative.
But  his  approach  imposes  costs.  By  adopting  a  judge-centered
perspective  focused  on  the  problem  of how  to  decide  hard  cases,
Dworkin  in  Law's Empire pays  relatively  little  heed  to  Hart's  ques-
tions  of what  the  constitutive  features  of a  legal  system  typically
are,  how those  features  interact  with  and  depend  on  each  other,
how  law functions in  social  life  outside  the courts,  and what pres-
sures judges  feel  to  conform  to  established  standards.  Dworkin
does  not  wholly  ignore  Hart's  questions.  He  says  repeatedly  that
law  is  an  "interpretive practice" 9 in  which  an  interpretation  must
achieve  sufficient  fit  with  the  practice  of the  legal  community  to
count  as  an  interpretation  rather  than  a revision.50  He  also  elabo-
rates  what he  takes  to  be  a necessary  core  of shared  assumptions
for  an  interpretive  community  to  exist.51  But while  Dworkin  does
Id. at  266.  According  to  Dworkin,  moral  and  legal  skepticism  are  either  empty,  see  id. at
76-86,  or  misguided,  see  id. at  267-75,  ideas,  and  the  conceptual  connection  of  law  and
morality  makes  law  objective  and  determinate  in  the  same  way  and  to  the  same  extent
that morality  is.  Morality,  in  other  words,  fills  any  legal  gaps and  resolves  any  ambiguities
that might  otherwise  exist.
47  Id.  at  413;  see  also  id. at  190  (characterizing  "political  obligation"  as  a  related
"protestant idea"  calling for  "fidelity  to a  scheme  of principle  each  citizen  has  a  responsi-
bility  to  identify, ultimately  for himself,  as  his  community's  scheme").
48  See id  at  64  ("[E]ach  of the  participants  in  a  social  practice  must distinguish  be-
tween  trying  to  decide  what  other  members  of his  community  think the  practice  requires
and  trying  to  decide,  for himself, what  it really  requires.").
49  See,  eg.,  id.  at 50,  87.  For an  interesting  analysis  of the  concept  of  the  practice,
and  a set  of useful  distinctions  among  different  kinds  of practices,  see Thomas  Morawetz,
The  Concept of a  Practice, 24  PHIL  STUD.  209  (1973).
50  See,  eg.,  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  254-58.
51  According  to  Professor  Postema's  sensitive  reconstruction,  "four conditions  define
what,  in  Dworkin's  view,  is  necessary  and  minimally  sufficient  for  intelligible  interpretive
activity  within  a  practice":
(1)  Generic  or  background -consensus:  participants  must  share  a  language  and
understand  the  world  about  them  in  much  the  same  way,  have  roughly  similar
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not attempt  to cut his theory free from  such anchors,  Law's Empire
places  little emphasis  on system-maintaining  social  forces,  including
social  pressure  to  conform.  On  the  contrary,  Dworkin  leans  dis-
tinctly  in  the  opposite  direction 2  with  his  recurrent  suggestion
that interpretation  is an  irreducibly protestant  enterprise, in which
each judge  must  develop  her  own  theory  of how  to  characterize
the  relevant  legal  materials  in the  best moral  light. 3  On my read-
ing,  Dworkin's  conception  of  interpretive  protestantism  implies
that judges  characteristically  are  not and should not be concerned
with  the  rival  interpretations  that  others  will  predictably  devel-
op.
54
This position  seems  untenable. At its heart, law has  a function
of guiding  and  coordinating  human  activity,"  and  successful  co-
ordination  requires  attention  to  the  likely  views  and responses  of
others. 56  Within  the  American  legal  system,  for  example,  an  effec-
tive  lawyer must make  predictive judgments  that attend, not just to
the  formal  materials  of the  law,  but to  psychological  and  political
interests  and  concerns,  and,  in  general,  participate  in  the  same  sufficiently  con-
crete  "form of life"  . . . . (2)  Boundary  consensus:  they  must  also  agree  on  the
"extension"  or  domain  of the  practice,  i.e.,  on  what  behaviors,  actions,  decisions,
claims  (or  rather  claimings)  count  as  falling  within  the  practice,  and  which  fall
outside  it.  (3)  Paradigm  consensus:  they  must  also  recognize  certain  claims  or
propositions  regarding  what  the  practice  requires  to  be  true  within  the  practice,
if any  are.  Finally,  (4)  fit  consensus:  while  participants  may  disagree  widely  re-
garding  substantive  "background"  values  (e.g.,  ideals  of  political  morality)  there
must  not be  "too  great  a  disparity" among  participants  regarding  the  amount  of
fit necessary  to provide  a  viable  distinction  between  interpretation  and  invention.
Gerald J.  Postema,  "Protestant"  Interpretation and Social Practices, 6  LAw  &  PHIL.  282,  298-99
(1987).
52  See LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  88  (discussing  the  mistake  of emphasizing  fac-
tors  promoting consensus  over  those  leading  to  disagreement).
53  See  id.  at  190,  252,  413.
54  See  id. at  64-65  ("[E]ach  of the  participants  in  a  social  practice  must  distinguish
between  trying  to  decide  what  other  members  of his  community  think  the  practice  re-
quires  and  trying  to  decide,  for  himself,  what  it  really  requires.").  Dworkin  compares  a
judge's  task  to  that  of a  chain  novelist who  must  continue,  in  the  best  way  that she  can,
a  story  that includes  prior chapters  written  by  other  authors.  Id. at  229.  But  he does  not
suggest  that  the  chain  novelist  must  seek  to  anticipate  what  future  authors  in  the  chain
are  likely  to  view  as  successful  contributions,  even  when  contemplating  a  "brilliant"  but
pathbreaking  interpretation  that characterizes  past events  in  a  light  that  past authors  had
never  characterized  them  in.  Id. at  247-48;  see  also  id. at  58  (asserting  that  each  partici-
pant  in  a  practice  reaches  his own  interpretation  by  "trying  to  discover  his  own  intention
in  maintaining  and  participating  in  that  practice"  and  characterizing  social  interpretation
as  "a conversation  with  oneself").
55  See,  e.g.,  Gerald  J. Postema,  Coordination and  Convention at  the Foundations of Law,
11  J. LEGAL  STUD.  165  (1982).
56  See  id.
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factors  that  include  changes  in  the  social  and  economic  culture
and in  the composition of the bench. Similarly, lower court judges
must  not  simply  ask  what  theory  would  portray  past  decisions  in
the  best  light;  they  must  also  pay  heed  to  what  result  appellate
judges  are  likely to reach.
I do not wish  to push  this point too far. It is not my view that
conscientious judges  are  always  bound  to  decide  a  case  as  they
think a higher court would. Within  our legal  system,  for example,
the  relationship  between  higher  and  lower  courts  has  a  dialogic
element;  the  creative  handiwork  of lower  courts  can  help  affect
how  a  higher  court  will  view  a  particular  issue,  if and when  the
higher court  explicitly  undertakes  to decide  it. Nevertheless,  lower
courts  clearly  are  not  created  equal  to  higher  courts,  and  the
lower  courts'  obligation  of  conceptual  faithfulness  to  precedent
cannot be understood  independently of higher  courts'  own under-
standing, in the psychological  sense,  of what their  decisions  mean.
Even  at the  level  of a  court  such  as  the  American  Supreme
Court, a Justice  has  an  obligation  to look forward  and outward  to
other judges  and  lawyers,  as  well  as  backward  at  the  authorities
requiring interpretation,  and to reason  in ways  that the profession
will  regard  as  sensible  and  lawful.58  A judge  or Justice  who  ren-
dered  a  decision  that  she  knew  would  be  regarded  as  legally
insupportable  by  the  overwhelming  preponderance  of the  legal
community--even  if  she  believed  that  her  interpretation  showed
settled  authorities  in  the  best  moral  light-would  most  often,  if
not always, be  outside  the bounds  of law. 59
Conceivably,  Dworkin  would  not  want  so  much  made  of  his
claims  for  interpretive  protestantism. °  He  undoubtedly  aspires  to
57  The  failure  to  make  these  predictions  would  foster  inconsistency  and  uncertainty,
multiply the  number of appeals,  and  unreasonably  burden  litigants  by  increasing  litigation
costs.
58  Dworkin  suggests  that  a judge  ought  to  take  public  morality  into  account,  see
LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 249,  but  makes  no parallel  claim  about  normative  commit-
ments  of  members  of  the  legal  profession.  Cf  id. at  64  ("[E]ach  of  the  participants  in  a
social  practice  must  distinguish  between  trying  to  decide  what  other  members  of  his
community  think  the  practice  requires  and  trying  to  decide,  for  himself, what  it  really
requires.").
59  See Postema,  supra note  55,  at  192-93.  The  qualification  may  be  necessary  to  deal
with  implicit  conventions  about the  permissible  role  of a judge  in  attempting  to promote
what  is  effectively  a  change  of  law.  The  implicit  rules  of judging  do  not  invariably  bar
the  planting  of a  seed  that a judge  may  reasonably  hope  will  change  the  legal  landscape
in  the  fullness of time.
60  Read  narrowly,  Dworkin's  protestantism  claim  might  mean  only  that  a judge  or
Justice  must  ultimately  decide  for  herself  how  much  weight  she  ought  to  give  to  the
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maintain  a  delicate  balance:  to  account  for  the  centrifugal  forces
that produce  as  much  consensus  and cohesion  as characteristically
exist  in law while  at the  same  time explicating  the  phenomena  of
uncertainty,  argument,  and  creative  insight. 61   In  Law's  Empire,
however,  his  line  of argument  is  so  carefully  crafted  to  explain
and justify  the  latter  phenomena  that  the  former  get  somewhat
short shrift.  The  emphasis  is  all  on  intellectual  thrust  and  parry,
not  on  the felt experience  of an  external  and peremptory  source
of authority  or  of a  need  to  achieve  coordination  with  the  deci-
sional  patterns  of  others.  Whatever  interpretive  protestantism
might  cash  out  to  mean,  Dworkin's  argument  has  tipped  in  a
direction  decisively  different from  Hart's.
D. Rules, Facticity, and the Social Construction of Reality
Dworkin's  reasons  for  declining  to  follow  Hart  are  many  and
varied, but his central  concern  involves  the difficulties  of founding
an  analysis  of law,  as  Hart  attempted  to  do, on  the  concept  of a
social  rule.  As  abundant  and helpful  criticism  has  established,  the
concept of a "rule," as that term  is  perhaps most familiarly  under-
stood,  is  too  crude  to  do  the  work  Hart  assigns  it.  The  term
"rule," which  later  authors  have  contrasted  with  standards  or prin-
ciples,62  may  connote  a  norm  that admits  concise,  canonical  for-
mulation  and  that  necessarily  applies  in  an  all-or-nothing  way.0
Not all norms  that  are relevant  to  legal  decisionmaking  are  of this
anticipated  views  of  other  judges  or Justices,  there  being  no  canonical  formulation  to
resolve  this  question  for  her.  Cf  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra  note  1,  at  313-14  (Hercules,
Dworkin's  prototype  of  the  ideal judge,  "must  rely  on  his  own  judgment  in  answering"
questions  of political  morality  "not because  he thinks  his  opinions  are  automatically  right,
but  because  no  one  can  properly  answer  any  question  except  by  relying  at  the  deepest
level  on  what  he  himself believes.").  But  this  reading  of  protestantism  is  too  weak  to  be
interesting.  Cf Postema,  supra note  51,  at  288  ("Of course,  ultimately  one  can  only  come
to  one's own  view  of the  practice.  In  this  trivial  sense,  even  to  defer  to  the  majority  is  to
come  to  'one's  own'  view  of  the  practice,  .viz.,  that  its  meaning  is  determined  by  the
majority.").
61  See  LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1, at  88-93.
62  See,  e.g.,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY,  supra note  1, at  22-28;  Duncan  Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89  HARV.  L.  REV.  1685  (1976).  For  criticism  of
Dworkin's  distinction  between  rules  and  principles  and  a  suggestion  that  rules  can  be
"overridden" as  much  as  principles  can,  see  SCHAUER,  supra  note  36 at  12-15.
63  It  is  unclear  whether  Hart wished  the  term  "rule" to  be limited  in  such  a way  as
to  distinguish  it  from  vaguer  or  more  flexible  principles,  conventions,  and  standards.  See
Margaret J. Radin,  Reconsidering the  Rule of Law,,  69  B.U.  L.  REV.  781,  794  &  n.39  (1989).
He  was  at  pains,  for  example,  to  assert  that  the  rule  of  recognition  could  be  vague  or
indeterminate.  Other  passages,  however,  seem  to  trade  implicitiy  on  the  paradigmatic  use
of the  word  "rule"  to  identify  standards  capable  of quasi-syllogistic  applicability.
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kind.  Common  law  "rules" lend  themselves  to  alternative  formula-
tions, so  that competent  lawyers  can disagree  about what  the rule
is,  as  well  as  about whether  it  applies  to  a  particular  set of facts.
Norms of constitutional  and statutory interpretation  are  also  likely
to be  vague  or conflicted,  or  to prescribe  kinds  of balancing  pro-
cesses  that  predictably  will  result  in  disagreement  among  lawyers
and judges.
On  the  other  hand,  abundant  commentary  has  also  demon-
strated  that  the basic  point  of Hart's  rule-based  analysis  is  not to
show the uniform nature  of all legal "rules," but to illuminate how
law  is  grounded  in  social  fact  and  to  clarify  why  there  is  no
strong,  conceptual  connection  between  the  relevant  social  facts
and  standards  of  ultimate  moral  right."  Hart's  basic  emphasis
can  easily  be  maintained  by  a  theory  that  accounts  for  law's
facticity  through  reference  to  a  variety  of  types  of  pre-
cepts65--rules,  principles,  conventions,'  and  so  forth-departure
64  See  ag.,  Macde,  supra  note  2,  at 6.
65  See,  e.g.,  NEIL  MAcCORMCtK,  H.L.A.  HART  40-43,  123  (1981);  Joseph  Raz,  Legal
Prindples and the  Limits  of Law,  81  YALE  LJ.  823,  845  (1972);  Jules  L.  Coleman,  Book
Review,  66  CAL.  L.  REV.  885,  897  (1978).
66  See Harry  T.  Edwards,  The  Rol  of a Judge in  Modern Society: Some  Reflections on  Cur-
rent Practice  in  Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32  CLEV.  ST.  L.  REV.  385,  398-99  (1983-84).
The  first  set  of conventions  that  I  have  in  mind  pertains  to  permissible
forms  of reasoning,  sensed  and observed  by almost  all  members  of the American
legal  profession.  Precisely  because  we  take  these  habits  of  mind  so  for  granted,
it  is  difficult  to  identify  the ways  and  occasions  in  which  they  constrain  us.  The
context  in  which  their  role  and importance  is  perhaps  most  evident is  analogical
reasoning;  lawyers  gradually  acquire  a  feel  (from  law  school,  from  everyday  dis-
cussion  with  their  colleagues,  from  the  responses  to  briefs  and  oral  arguments)
for  what kinds  of efforts  to  link  concepts,  rules,  and  cases  from  distinct  spheres
of the  law  are  credible  and  what  kinds  are  not. The  net  result  is  that  lawyers
have  a  sense,  different  from  and  more  consistent  than  laypersons'  comparable
sense,  of  what  constitutes  a  plausible  or  forceful  reference  or  comparison  and
what  constitutes  a  weak or strained  one.
[A  second  set of  conventions  existing  among judges]  relate[s]  to  common
standards  of judgment  in  case  handling:  for  example,  . . . a  willingness  among
judges  to  adhere  to  existing  precedent  . . . . This  last  category  of  conven-
tions  . . . consists  of a  collection  of intertwined  sensitivities:  a  feel  for what sorts
of decisions  can  fhirly be  described as  "clarifications,"  "reforms,"  or  "adjustments"
of the  body  of law and what  must be described  as  "departures"  from  it;  a  suspi-
cion  of the  latter;  and  a  distrust of all  lines  of argument  that would  lead  toward
the  latter.  It  is  tis  last-mentioned  group  of  attitudes  . . . that I  think  Cardozo
was  referring  to when  he  spoke  of  "the  duty  of adherence  to  the  spirit  of the
law."  Put more bluntly,  it  is  an awareness  of where  the  trodden  path  lies,  and  a
sense,  not only  of the  danger,  but of the  impropriety  of straying  too  far from  it.
Id.  (citations  omitted).
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from  which  is  likely  to  be  viewed  in  the  relevant  community  as
appropriately  subject  to  criticism  or  other  sanction.  Indeed,
Hart's  mode  of  analysis  is  entirely  consistent  with  a  view,  often
associated  with  Wittgenstein,  that  inverts  the  usual  understanding
of the relationship  between  some  (if not all)  legal  rules and  agree-
ment  in  legal  judgment.'  According  to  this  theory,  rules  and
conventions  do not cause agreement;  rather, it is the fact of agree-
ment  that  allows  us  to  say  there  are  rules  or  conventions.'  In
order  for  rules  to  be  constitutive  of a  legal  system,  lawyers  and
judges do not need  to be able  to recite  (all of)  the rules that they
follow, nor must rules enter the conscious  mind, as  such, in  order
to  guide  anyone  to  a  legal  conclusion.  With  respect  to  the  inter-
pretation  of precedent,  for  example,  it  is  sufficient  that  there  is
substantial  uniformity  of judgment,  that  there  is  expressed  disap-
proval  of deviant judgments,  and  that a  threat of disapproval  of
deviant  reasoning  is  experienced  by  lawyers  and judges  as  an  as-
pect  of the social  reality  that is  the  law.
For  other  accounts  of  the  nature  of convention  and  its  role  in  legal  reasoning,  see
Owen  M.  Fiss,  Conventionalism  58  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  177  (1985);  Dennis M.  Patterson,  Laws
Pragmatism: Law as Pracdie &  Narrative,  76  VA.  L.  REV.  937  (1990);  Postema,  supra note
55.
67  For a  discussion  of the  appropriate  community,  see  supra note  32.
68  For  a sensitive  exposition  of this  view  and  a  discussion  of its  debated  relation  to
Wittgenstein's  own  thought,  see  Radin,  supra note 63.
69  Stanley  Fish  has  argued  that  the  term  "rule" is  misapplied  if used  in  the  former
sense  and  redundant  or misleading  if used  in  the  latter.  See,  e.g.,  Stanley  Fish, Fish v. Fiss,
36  STAN.  L.  REV.- 1325  (1984).  Fish's argument,  roughly  summarized,  is  that  it  is  impossi-
ble  to formulate- the  "rules" of legal  practice  independently  of the  goals  and  values  char-
acteristic of that  practice  and  the  situations  within  the  practice  where  legal  interpretations
are  offered.  Once  the  situations  for the  rules'  application  are  specified  in  this  way,  how-
ever,  the  "rules"  become  redundant,  since  anyone  who  grasps  the  situation  will  under-
stand  how  to  proceed  without  reference  to  the  rules.  My  own  tentative  view  is  that  this
critique  helps  to  bring  out  the  mistake  of thinking  that  all  rules, just because  they are
"rules," must bear  the  same  relationship  to  behavioral  regularities  or  mental  phenomena.
In  law,  I  believe  a  crucially  dialectical  relationship  exists  between  rules  and  conven-
tions-which  do,  to  be  sure,  importantly  reflect  or  summarize  characteristic  behaviors  of
those  engaged  in  legal  practice-and  the  practice  that  the  rules  purport  to regulate.  For
a  participant  in  the  practice,  in  times  of  uncertainty  and  puzzlement  about  how  she
ought  to  proceed,  may  attempt  to  formulate  the  rules  for herself  in  order  to  be  able  to
refer  to  them  to  guide her  behavior.  See  Fiss,  supra note  66.
70  To  use  the  term  "rule" this capaciously-as  Hart  does, for  example,  in  characteriz-
ing  the  "rule  of recognition"  as  a  social  "rule"--is  arguably  misleading.  This  usage  goes
substantially  beyond  Frederick  Schauer's  helpful  definition  of rules  as  entrenched  gener-
alizations.  See SCHAUER,  supra  note  36.  The  "rule  of recognition"  could plausibly  be  char-
acterized  as  a  complex  "practice"  of  law-interpreting  officials  that  defies  reduction  to  a
single  rule.  See Postema,  supra note  55,  at  168.  If the  rule  of  recognition  is  really  a  prac-
tice,  however,  the  practice  is  very  much  a social  one,  aimed  at achieving  coherence  and
coordination,  see  id. at  192-93,  and  the  guiding  interest  in  achieving  coherence  and  coor-
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To  put the  point another  way,  Hart's  approach  illuminatingly
parallels  the  work  of  other  philosophers71  and  social  scientists72
wh6  have  theorized  about  what  is  sometimes  called  "the  social
construction  of  reality."'  Phenomena  such  as  law,  legal  systems,
rules,  conventions,  and  principles  are  not  part  of  the  physical
universe;  they are  socially created, and there  is  little if any  natural
necessity  about  their  form  or  content.  But  though  phenomena
such  as legal 'systems,  legal rules, and  conventions  of legal  reason-
ing  are  human  creations-imaginably  different  and  susceptible  to
change-they  confront  particular  individuals  as  external  and  fre-
quently  coercive.74  Indeed,  their  externality  is  a  social  fact,  re-
flected in  pressure  to conform.
7 5
The socially  constructed  aspect of legal practice  deserves  both
elucidation  and  emphasis. Judges  undoubtedly  have  to  engage  in
interpretation,  at least  in  some  sense  of  that term,  and  Dworkin
has  made  a  major  contribution  both  in  emphasizing  this  and  in
showing  how  complex  an  enterprise  legal  interpretation  may  be.
But it is  helpful  to  be  as  clear  as  possible  about  what judges  have
to  interpret, about  the constraints  to which  they are  subject,  and
why.76  To  my mind, Law's Empire's emphasis  on  "protestant" inter-
dination  gives  rise  to  and  reinforces  "regularities  in  . . . identifying,  interpreting,  and
applying  rules  of law  [that]  amount  to  conventions  around  which  mutually  interdepen-
dent expectations  are  focused."  Id. at 194-95.  To  my mind,  the  conventional  aspect of law
and legal  interpretation  and  the  social  pressures  surrounding  them  provide  ample  reason
for  assimilating  what Hart  calls  the  "rule" of recognition  to  social  rules and  conventions.
71  See,  e.g.,  PETER  WINCH,  THE  IDEA  OF A SOCIAL  SCIENCE  (1958).
72  See,  mg.,  CLIFFORD  GEERTZ,  LOCAL  KNOWLEDGE  (1983);  INTERPRETIVE  SOCIAL  SCI-
ENCE:  A READER  (Paul  Rabinow  &  William  Sullivan,  eds.  1979).
73  e  P=E  L.  BERGER  &  THOMAS  LUCKMANN,  THE  SOCIAL  CONSTRUCTION  OF  RE-'
ALrrY  (1966).
74  See  id. at  60-61  (explaining how  the  "institutional world  ...  is  experienced  as an
objective  reality,"  even  though  it is  in  one  sense  a  product  of human  thought).
75  &e ANDREW  ALTMAN,  CRITICAL  LEGAL  STUDIES:  A  LIBERAL  CRITIQUE  179-86  (1990).
76  In TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY,  supra note  1,  Dworkin  argued  that Hart's concept  of
a  rule  was  too narrow  and unbending  to capture  all  of the  constituent  components  of a
legal  system;  he viewed  "principles" as  necessary  elements  as well.  In  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra
note  1,  however,  although  he  allows  that  rules  and  conventions  have  a  place  in  pre-in-
terpretive  understandings  of  law,  id. at  65-66,  Dworkin  appears  to  believe  that their  role
in  interpretive  accounts  will  be  contingent  at  best.  He  offers  two  main  reasons.  First,
Dworkin  believes  rule- or  convention-based  accounts  to be  incompatible  with  the phenom-
enon  of theoretical  disagreement  in  law  that  he wishes  to  explain:  the  phenomenon  that
lawyers  and judges  frequently  disagree  in  their judgments  concerning what  the  pertinent
rules  or  conventions  are  or  whether  they  apply  to  particular  cases:  See  id.  at  122-30.
Clearly,  however,  it  must  be  compatible  with  the  concept  of  a  rule  or  convention  for
there  to  be  disagreement  about  what  a  rule  or  convention  means,  or  even  whether  a
particular  rule  or  convention  exists  at  all.  See  Morawetz,  supra  note  49,  at  215-20.  As  I
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pretation  tends  to  slight the  social  forces  at work  in giving  rise  to
and maintaining  the  phenomenon  we  know as  "law."
III.  MORALIZED  INTERPRETATION
Like  his  closely  related  claim  concerning  interpretive  protes-
tantism,  Dworkin's  argument  that  legal  interpretation  necessarily
attempts  to portray legal  authorities  in the best moral light almost
inevitably  clouds  the  centrality  of convention  and  facticity  to  the
concept of law.
suggested  above,  see  supra  text  accompanying  notes  68-70,  the  best  measure  of  the  exis-
tence  of a  rule  is frequently  agreement  in judgment;  a  positivist  or conventionalist  theory
need  not  enter  the  debate  whether  rules  or  conventions  actually  cause  agreement,  or
whether  it  is  the  fact of  agreement  that causes  us  to  say  there  are  rules  or  conventions.
It  suffices  to  sustain  a  rule-based  account  if there  is  substantial  uniformity  in judgment,
there  is  expressed  disapproval of deviant judgments,  and  the  awareness  of potential  disap-
proval  if  legal  reasoning  is  not  carried  on  in  ways  conventionally  viewed  as  correct  is
experienced  by  lawyers  and judges  as  an  aspect of  the  social  reality  that is  the  law.
Moreover,  as  Hart  acknowledges  may  be  the  case  with  what  he  calls  the  rule  of
recognition,  there  is  no  conceptual  difficulty  about  recognizing  that  rules  or conventions
can  be vague,  conflicted,  or  indeterminate.  However  indeterminate  the  conventions  that
comprise  a  legal  system  such  as  ours,  the  basic,  positivist  point  still  holds:  the  principles,
standards, and  criteria  that jointly  comprise  what  Hart  calls  the  rule  of recognition  owe
their  status  as  such  to  understandings  of  the  legal  profession  that  exist  as  a  matter  of
fact,  not as  a  matter  of moral  or  logical  necessity.  What  counts  as  "law" and  "legal argu-
ment!  is  deeply  and  thoroughly  contingent,  but  all  of  the  contingencies  are  best  ex-
plained  by  reference  to  the facts  of social  life  and  legal  practice.
Here  Dworkin  lodges  a  second objection.  He  believes  that  rule- or  convention-based
accounts  of  the  criteria  of validity  within  a  legal  system  are  inadequate  to  explain  the
phenomena  of legal  creativity  and legal  change.  See  LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra  note  1,  at  136-
37.  Once  again,  however,  Dworkin's  conception  of a  rule  or  convention  is  unnecessarily
static  and  unbending.  The  set  of  conventions  specifying  how  the  law  should  be  identi-
fled-what  Hart  calls  the  rule  of  recognition-may  change,  just as  other  social  conven-
tions  and practices  change.  See JOSEPH  RAz, THE  AuTnoary  OF  LAW.  ESSAYS  ON  LAW  AND
MORALITY  98  (1979)  ("The  rule  of recognition  is  a customary  rule;  hence  it is  constantly
in  the  process of  change.");  Gerald J.  Postema,  Tim  Normativity of Law,  in  IsSUES  IN  CON-
TEMPORARY  PHILOSOPHY,  THE  INFLUENCE  OF H.LA.  HART,  at 81,  100-01  (Ruth  Gavison  ed.,
1987);  Postema,  supra  note 55,  at 178-79.  What is  met  with criticism  today may not meet
with  criticism  tomorrow.  A  court  may  refuse  to  accept  some  aspect  of the  rule  of recog-
nition,  and  it  may  even  happen,  though  it  need  not,  that  "a  very  surprising  piece  of
judicial  law-making  concerning  the  very  sources  of law  may  be  calmly  'swallowed.'"  HART,
supra note  3,  at  150.  Within  our  constitutional  law,  for  example,  it  is  easy  to  imagine
that  this  is  what  happened  during  the  New  Deal:  beginning in  1937,  the  Supreme  Court
simply  ceased  to  recognize  as  law  rules  and  principles  that  had  previously  enjoyed  that
status-not  only  rejecting  Lodiner but  effectively  rewriting  the  commerce  and  contracts
clauses  as  well.  If a  transformation  of  this  kind  occurs,  the  rule  of recognition  will  itself
have  been* altered.  But  the  system,  as  Hart  recognized,  can  remain  rule-  or  convention-
governed  in  its  fundamental  operation.  See  id.
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A.  Law and the  "Interpretive  Attitude"
Although  Dworkin  founds  his  theory  of law  on an  account  of
how judges  do  and  should  decide  hard  cases,  he  furnishes  no
strong  reason  for  thinking  that judges  must  approach  hard  cases
the same  way in every system  that we would  characterize  as a legal
system.77  Nor  is  it  clear  that he  means  to  claim  this.7  At  times,
he suggests  that jurisprudence  is not properly  concerned  with law
as  a general,  cross-cultural  phenomenon, but is  always and irreduc-
ibly interpretive  of the  practices  of a particular  society.7'  At  other
times,  however,  his  arguments  suggest  that  it  is  precisely  because
law  is an  inherently interpretive  concept,  regardless  of its cultural
context,  that  the  most  interesting  substantive  questions  are  likely
to involve  particular interpretations  of particular  practices. 8 0
The underlying  issue  is  a hard one.  A deep understanding  of
law must grasp its significance  in a humanly constructed,  culturally
contingent, and variable  universe  of meaning.8 s  At  the  same  time,
illuminating  cross-cultural  comparisons  are  possible,  and  these
require  the  deployment  of a  conceptual  apparatus  adequate  to
mark  the  characteristic  features  of phenomena  such  as  law  and
legal  systems  that  permit  them  to  be  identified,  referred  to,  and
contrasted.  Hart, for example,  aspires  to identify  the  characteristic,
cross-cultural  features  of law that make  comparative jurisprudence
possible,  but tries  to  preserve  a  space  for  local,  hermeneutic  in-
sight  by  insisting  that  he  is  elucidating  the  concept  of  law,  not
providing  a  hard  definition. 2  This  is  a  fine  line  to  walk,  but  it
has  the virtue  of making  comparative  social  science  intelligible.  If
Dworkin's  theory  is  to  do  similar  work,  he  too  must  make  some
claim about the nature of law that is similarly  cross-culturally appli-
77  Cf.  Philip  Soper,  Dworkin's  Domain,  100  HARV.  L.  REV.  1166,  1166-67,  1181-82
(1987)  (book review).
78  See  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1, at  411  ("General  theories  of law,  for us,  are  gen-
eral  interpretations  of our own judicial  practice.").
79  See,  e.g.,  id. at  79,  102,  423  n.15.
80  If Dworkin  is  not making  a claim  of  this  kind,  it would seem  to follow  that he  is
not so  much  disagreeing  with  theories  like  Hart's  as  attempting  to  refocus  the  question
that  theories  of law  attempt  to  answer.  For an  illuminating  discussion,  see Kenneth  Kress,
The Interpretive Turn, 97  ETHICS  834,  842-43  (1987).
81  On  the  difficulties  of cross-cultural  applications  of  concepts  whose  meanings  may
be  culturally dependent,  see,  ag.,  GEERTZ,  supra note  72;  2  CHARLES  TAYLOR,  INTERPRETA-
TION  AND  THE  SCIENCES  OF  MAN  IN  PHILOSOPHY AND  THE  HUMAN  SCIENCES:  PHILOSOPHI-
CAL  PAPERS  13  (1985);  WINCH,  supra  note  71.
82  See  HART,  supra note  3,  at  16-17.
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cable.  Although  his  signals  are  mixed,  I  take  him  to  be  claiming
that  a  central,  recurring  characteristic  of  "law"  as  we  know  it  is
that it must be  interpreted,  and that its interpretation  requires  the
adoption  of an  "interpretive  attitude."'  Judges,  in  other  words,
must  assume  that  law and  legal  practice  "serve[]  some  interest  or
purpose  . . . that  can  be  stated  independently  of just  describing
the  rules  that  make  up  the  practice,"  and  they  must  further  as-
sume  that "the strict rules must be understood  ...  or modified or
qualified  or  limited"  by  the  practice's  "point.""  Based  on  this
understanding  they  must  "try  to  impose  meaning on  the  [prac-
tice]-to see  it in its best light-and then  to restructure  it in light
of that meaning."8
Whether  taken  as  a  cross-cultural  statement  about  law  or  a
more  localized  assertion  about  American  practice,  the  claim  that
judges  must  attempt  to  see  law  and  legal  practice  in  their  "best
light" and  to  "restructure" them  accordingly  seems  to  me  a strong
one.  As  with  his  claims  about  interpretation  being  a  "protestant"
enterprise,  Dworkin  is  attempting  to  account  simultaneously  for
constraint  and  individuality,  social  control  and  individual  moral
responsibility; 86  but,  again  as  with  his  characterization  of interpre-
tation  as protestant,  he cannot  entirely  have  it both  ways.  In Law's
Empire, his  emphasis  seems  unmistakably  individualistic  and moral-
ized.
Assessed  in  relative  isolation,  the  claim  that the  nature  of law
inherently  requires  judges  to  assume  a  moralizing  "interpretive
attitude"87  invites  persuasive  objections.  Descriptively,  we  should
not mistake  the  relatively  open-ended  character  of American prac-
tice  for  a  necessary  truth  about  law.  In  other  systems,  rules  may
bind  more  tightly.  Moreover,  even  within  our  system,  it  is  clear
that judges  can,  and frequently  do,  embrace  the  apparent  clarity
of  familiar  rules  or  seek  the  resolutions  that  they  believe  least
likely  to  incur  resistance  from  professional  colleagues.'  Nor,
when  they  do  so,  do  they  necessarily  violate  the  conventions  that
define  the  minimal  obligations  of judicial  office.89  Indeed,  if we
83  See  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 47.
84  Id
85  1
86  See  i& at  88.
87  Id-
88  See  Meir  Dan-Cohen,  Law, Community,  and Communication,  1989  DUKE  LJ.  1654.
89  Cf  Robert  M.  Cover,  Foreword: Nomos  and Narrative, 97  HARV.  L.  REV.  4,  53-60
(1983)  (criticizing  the  "apologetic  and  statist  orientation"  of  "current  understandings"  of
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want  to  understand  law  as  a  social  phenomenon,  it  is  crucial  to
appreciate  how legal  rules-including  relatively  clear rules of juris-
diction  and hierarchy-can  sometimes  insulate judges  from  a psy-
chological  sense  of responsibility  for  their  decisions.  This  psycho-
logical  sense  of insulation  may help  in turn  to  explain why  unjust
rules  of substantive  law  can  be  more  or  less  routinely  enforced
even by judges who  apprehend  the injustice.
90
The  debate,  however,  is  by  no  means  entirely  descriptive.
Dworkin  frames  his  position  at least partly in rebellion  against  the
prospect  of judicial  self-distancing  from  substantive  injustice  en-
forced  in  the name  of law;  he  sees  it as  morally  desirable  to por-
tray  the judicial function  as  one  of attempting,  within  what  seem
in  Law's Empire to be  broad bounds,  to bring  positive  law into line
with  moral  justice.91  If  adopted  as  a  practical  strategy,  however,
the partial  equation  of legal  with  moral  right seems  to me' to un-
derestimate  the  significance  of contingent  social  circumstances.  If
legal  and  social  conventions  are  strong  and  tight, judicial  resis-
tance  in  the  name  of justice  is  unlikely  to  occur  and  even  less
likely  to  succeed.  If, on  the other  hand,  legal  and  social  conven-
tions are  loose  and weak, to deprecate  the significance  of substan-
tive  and jurisdictional  rules for judicial  decisionmaking  is not only
to invite unpredictability and disorder but, in reasonably democrat-
ic regimes, to subvert  democracy. Courts  may be  better at identify-
ing right and justice  than other branches of government,  but  they
may  also be  worse.  At stake  are  issues  of power, which  should  be
debated  in  those  terms,  and  not resolved  as  an  aspect  of a  claim
about the nature  of law.
92
the judicial  role  that  allows judges  to  escape  responsibility  for  the  ultimate  moral  right-
ness or  wrongness  of the  decisions  they  render  in  the  name  of the  law).
90  See  id.  In  the  American  legal  system,  rules  of jurisdiction  and  hierarchy  are  rela-
tively  rigid  and  uncontested,  and  their  widespread  recognition  and  enforcement  as  rules
play a  crucial  system-maintaining  role.  See  id. at 53-60.  A  theory  characterizing  legal inter-
pretation  as  a  deeply moralized  and protestant  enterprise  not only  fails  to  illuminate, but
actually obscures,  the  roles  of jurisdictional  and  hierarchical  rules.  See  id. at 35  n.98.
91  See  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  90-113  (arguing  that a  conception  of law,  in-
cluding  its  theory  of adjudication,  must be  tested  for  moral  attractiveness  as  well  as  fit
with  existing  practice).
92  Cf.  Frederick  Schauer,  Formairn, 97  YALE  LJ.  509,  542-43  (1988)  (arguing  that
questions  about whether judicial decisionmaking  should be  rule-bound are  concerned  with
power  and its  allocation).
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B.  Legal and Moral  Justification
These,  however,  are  not  the  arguments  that Dworkin  princi-
pally  engages  in  Law's Empire. His  aspiration,  clearly  and  admira-
bly, is  to recast a tired debate  by establishing  a new  argumentative
connection.  Dworkin  argues  for moralizing  the  concept  of law  to
the extent  that he  does  because  he  thinks this  approach  is  neces-
sary  to justify  an  affirmative  answer  to  the  question whether  there
is a moral  obligation  to obey the  law.93
Dworkin  begins  with  the  proposition  that  "[a]  state  is  legiti-
mate  [only]  if its  constitutional  structure  and  practices  are  such
that its citizens  have a general  [moral]  obligation  to obey  political
decisions  that  purport  to  impose  duties  on  them." 94  Reasoning
against this  background, he  claims  that every  legal argument  must
presuppose  an  argument  about  the  moral  legitimacy  of  the  legal
regime.  More  precisely,  every  legal  argument  reflects  a conception
of legal  practice,  and  every conception  of legal  practice  must  "de-
ploy  some argument  why law  on that  conception  provides  an  ade-
quate justification  for  coercion." 5  With  these  structural  premises
in  place, the  way to the  conclusion  seems  plain:  the  necessary  aim
of legal  arguments,  and  especially  of those  offered in  support of a
judicial  decision,  is  to justif )  the  exercise  of  the  state's  coercive
force in  moral  as well  as  legal  terms.
On  the  surface,  this  is  by  no  means  an  implausible  position.
Law  aspires  to  guide  human  conduct  by  furnishing  reasons  for
action.  Although  reasons  are  capable  of  diverse  classifications,  a
familiar scheme  identifies  two relevant  types: self-interested  reasons
and  moral  reasons. 96  It  is  implausible  that  a  legal  system  could
regularly  furnish  self-interested  reasons  to  do  what  the  law  re-
quires.  If there  is  anything  like  a  generally  applicable  reason  to
obey  the  law,  it is  therefore  tempting  to think that the  foundation
must be  moral.
When  argument  proceeds  along  this  line,  the  relevant  ques-
tion  is  obvious:  what  counts  as  a  claim  concerning  a  judicial
decision's  moral  legitimacy?  At  a minimum,  Dworkin  insists that  a
judicial justification  must  assert  a  decision  to  be  dictated  by  the
93  See  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  190-91.
94  Id. at  191.
95  Id.  at  139.
96  See Joseph  Raz,  Hart  on Moral Rights  and Legal Duties, 4  OXFORD J.  LEGAL  STUD.
123,  131  (1984).
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moral  theory  that paints  past political  decisions,  including  statutes
and legal precedents,  in the best moral light. This, undoubtedly, is
justification  of a sort. If we  accept  that legal decisions  are  morally
legitimate  insofar  as  they  reflect  the  best  interpretations  of  the
past political  decisions of a regime that is  morally adequate,  and if
we  further  accept  Dworkin's  controversial  theory  of adjudication,
then  all judicial  decisions  aspire  to furnish  moral justification  for
the exercise of the state's authority. Under  this view,  however, it is
conceivable  that  a  decision  enforcing  chattel  slavery  could  reflect
the best interpretation  of a political  regime  that was  not so  perva-
sively  unjust  that  its  past  political  decisions  could  justify  noth-
ing. 7  If this  can  be so-if a judicial  decision  can  'Justify"  slavery
as  a matter  of law-do  we  want  to  say  that the judge  in  asserting
the arguments  that establish  the  result necessarily  claims  that  the
result possesses  moral,  as  opposed  to legal,  legitimacy? 9"
Dworkin's  ambivalence  emerges  in  response  to  this  question.
In  characteristic  style,  his  argument  depends  on  a  distinction.
Legal  arguments,  he  explains,  justify  morally  by  displaying  the
virtue  of "integrity"  -- the  virtue  of a  community  that keeps  faith
with  the  commitments  of  principle  that  are  implicit  in  its  past
political  decisions.  But the  kind of moral justification  achieved  by
arguments  appealing  to  integrity  is  not  necessarily  the  ultimate
justification  typically  signalled  by  the  moral  "ought." Where  only
the former  can be achieved, a legal justification  will justify  morally,
but  only  in  an  inferior  sense  that  leaves  open  whether  anyone
would  be morally justified  (in the  stronger  sense)  in  doing,  much
less  morally required  (in  the  stronger  sense)  to  do,  what the  law
commands."tu  The  relationship  of these  two  types  of moral justi-
fication  to  our  ordinary  moral  vocabularies  is  never  adequately
explained,  and I doubt  that it  ever could  be.
C.  Retrospect and Prospect
For me, this is  the central  difficulty with  Dworkin's  third theo-
ry  of law.  Rather  than  muddling  the  concepts  of moral  justifica-
97  This  was  the  likely  situation  in  the  United  States  prior  to  the  Civil  War.  &e, e  g,
State  v.  Post, 20  N.J.L  368  (1845).
98  Many  of  the  northern  judges  who  upheld  and  enforced  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act
plainly  did  not  think  so.  For  a  penetrating  study,  see  ROBERT  M.  COVER,  JUSTICE  Ac-
cUSED:  ANTISLAVERY  AND  THE  JUDICIAL  PROCESS  (1975).
99  See  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 96.
100  &e id.  at  110-12,  190,  218-19.
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tion and moral  legitimacy  in this  way,  I  would prefer  to  keep  law
and morals  conceptually separate  in roughly the way that positivists
such  as  Hart  attempt  to  do.  But  I,  probably  in  common  with  a
good  many  others,  have  learned  too  much  from  Dworkin  simply
to embrace  a pre-Dworkinian  definition  and defense  of legal posi-
tivism.  The  testing  question  for  a  contemporary  positivist  or
conventionalist  theory  is  whether  it  can  deal  adequately  with
Dworkin's challenges  and  possibly incorporate  his central  insights.
IV.  THE  TWO  FACES  OF  LAW
The  central  historical  debate  that Dworkin's  theory  attempts
to  recast  is  about  how  best  to  understand  and  study  a  concept
that  is  irreducibly Janus-faced.'  On  one  side,  the  side  that posi-
tivism  portrays,  law  is  a  social  phenomenon-an  organized,  coer-
cive  institution  for  the  regulation  of  human  conduct.  Although
laws  and  legal  systems  are  frequently  unjust,  they  still function  in
the  characteristic,  organized,  coercive  ways,  and 'the fact  that they
deserve  criticism,  even  condemnation,  does  not  detract from  their
effectiveness  in regulating  conduct or from  their  status  as  law.  On
the  other  side,  the  side  that natural  law  theories  have  attempted
to  capture,  the  concept  of  law  expresses  a  human  ideal  and  a
standard  of  criticism. 0 2  When  someone  says  that  "an  unjust 'law
is  no  law  at  all,"  or  that  "what  some  have  called  'the  Nazi  legal
system'  was  really just a regime  of organized  terror,"  she has surely
spoken  intelligibly  and  possibly  eloquently.  The  deep  question
involves  the relationship  between  law's two  faces.
A.  The  Confusions of Amalgamation
So far, no  one has  succeeded  in  bringing the  two faces  of law
within  a  unitary  analysis,  beyond  recognizing  that  both  have  a
claim on  our thought and that both inform  our vocabulary.  To my
mind,  Dworkin's  failure  makes  it doubtful  that  a  synthesis  could
ever  succeed.  Law  looks  into  two worlds,  that of the  real  and that
of  the  ideal,  and  there  is  no  strong  conceptual  connection  be-
tween  the  two. 03  As  Lloyd  Weinreb  has  argued,  much  of  our  fa-
101  Cf  Ruth  Gavison,  Natural Law, Positivism, and the  Limits  of Jurspradence A  Modem
Round,  91  YALE  L.J.  1250  (1982)  (book  review)  (emphasizing  that  the  natural  law  and
positivist  positions,  in  sophisticated  modern  formulations,  are  not  so  much  contradictory
as  pursuing  the  study  of  law  in  different  ways  and  that  each  has  insights  to  offer  the
other).
102  See,  e.g.,  JOHN  FINNIS,  NATURAL  LAW  AND  NATURAL  RIGHTS  (1980).
103  1 use  the  phrase  "strong conceptual  connection"  to  leave  open  the  possibility  that
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miliar moral vocabulary,  possibly  reflecting  a deeper, subconscious
understanding, assumes the existence  of a fundamentally just natu-
ral  order.1°4  Our  legal  vocabulary,  which  overlaps  substantially
with  our  moral  vocabulary,  invites  similar  assumptions  about  a
natural  moral  order that runs  deeper  than  our  conventions.1'5  In
the  vision  of the  better  world  that  the  vocabulary  of rights  and
justice  invites  us  to  take  as  foundational  of legal  discourse,  there
would  be  no  collision  between  legal  right  and  moral  right,  no
injustice  under law.  It  is  obvious  that our world  is not that which
our discourse,  insofar  as  it sounds  in  idealized  terms,  assumes  or
imagines.  But  law,  as  a concept,  looks  into  that ideal  world,  even
as  it  looks  in  a  quite  different  direction  into  the  world  of social
fact.  Our understanding  of law  will be  deeply impoverished  if we
fail to recognize  this  duality.
Where  does this  analysis leave us in cases in which  the issue is
joined-in  cases,  for  example,  in  which  the  conscientious  judge
says  that  the law  is  that  the  slave  must be  returned,  and  the  per-
son  characterized  as  a  slave  protests  that a law  so  unjust is  really
no law at all? The answer,  no less  facially paradoxical  for its famil-
iarity,  is  that  they  are  not  necessarily  disagreeing  about  the  rules
or  conventions  of the  legal  system,  but, if at all,  about  what  the
judge  and  those  subject  to judicial  orders  ultimately  ought to  do.
In short, the disputants are  using  the word  "law"  in different  sens-
es.  The judge  (I  am  assuming)  invokes  the  result  dictated  by  ap-
plication  of settled  rules  or conventions.  The  person  denominated
a slave  makes  a claim  of justice:  the 'relevant  rules or conventions,
law,  in  order  to  function  as  such,  must  satisfy  certain  conditions  (such  as  being  intelli-
gible  and,  in  general,  prospective)  that  could  be  argued  to  reflect an  "inner morality  of
law."  &e,  eg.,  Lon  L.  Fuller,  Positivism and Fidelity to  Law-A  Reply  to  Professor Har,  71
HARv.  L.  REv.  630  (1958).  As  Professor  Hart  has  written,  "if this  is  what  the  necessary
connexion  of law  and  morality  means,  we  may  accept  it. It  is  unfortunately  compatible
with  very great iniquity."  HART,  supra note  3, at  202.  By  a  "strong conceptual  connection"
between  the  two  faces  of law, or  between  law and  morals,  I  am referring  to  the  kind  of
connection  that  would imply  that an  unjust  law,  or  at least  a  seriously  unjust  law,  is  not
law at  all.  By  insisting  that  no strong  conceptual  connection  exists  between  law and mor-
als,  I  also  do not mean  to  suggest  that  there  could  be  a  body  of law  whose  substantive
content  was  morally  abhorrent  to  all  relevant  segments  of the  population.  For  a further
discussion  of  what  I  call  "sociological"  connections  between  law  and  morals,  see  infra
notes  110-11  and accompanying  text.
104  See  LLOYD  L.  WEINREB,  NATURAL  LAW  AND  JUSTICE  30  (1987).  Similar  conclusions
are  common  among  social  scientists.  See,  e.g.,  BERGER  &  LUCKMANN,  supra note  73,  at  61-
62;  MELVIN  J.  LERNER,  THE  BELIEF  IN  A Jusr  WORLD:  A  FUNDAMENTAL  DELUSION  vii-viii
(1980).
105  See Weinreb,  supra note 34.
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if  they  dictate  a  result  that  is  so  seriously  unjust,  should  be
changed  or  disobeyed.  Any  reasons  that might  ordinarily  call  for
obeying  the  law,  including  the  judge's  promise  to  do  so,  must
yield  to supervening  moral  imperatives.
This  analysis,  which  seeks  on  the  one  hand  to  acknowledge
law's  two  faces,  may  seem  on  the  other to  take  away  what it pur-
ports  to  give.  It  may  appear  to  privilege  the  face  of law  that  is
rooted  in  social  fact by  assimilating  the  face  that  the  natural  law
tradition  exalts  to  the  independently  identifiable  realm  of morals.
But this,  I think, is the best analysis available;  if a privileging  is  de-
tected,  I  see  no  way  to avoid  it. Two  reasons  support  this  conclu-
sion.
First,  whatever  else  might  be  said  about  it,  the  positivist's
usage  cannot  plausibly  be  classified  as  a  linguistic  error.  On  the
contrary,  in  our  ordinary  legal  vocabularies  the  face  of law  that
identifies  law  and  legal  systems with  social fact  seems  to be  domi-
nant  and  the  natural  law  tradition  recessive.  Virtually  no  one  ar-
gues  that the  dictates  of moral  right are  necessarily  law within  an
existing  legal  system.  The  natural  law  influence  characteristically
asserts  itself, if at  all, only in legal  debates  about appropriate inter-
pretive  principles  or, even  more  rarely, in  assertions  that an unjust
law  is  not law at all.
Second,  and  more  controversially,  the  positivist  usage  can  be
defended  on  the  ground  that it deals  more  effectively  with what  I
take  to  be the  greater  practical  danger:  that people  may be  lulled
into  an  association  of  law  as  it  is  declared  by  established  institu-
tions  with  law  as  it ought  to be  and into  a  confusion  of legal  duty
as  identified by  state authorities  with  moral  duty." 0 6
As  against Dworkin's  amalgamating  approach,  the  reasons  for
preferring  a  simple  acknowledgement  of law's Janus-faced  charac-
ter are even  more  powerful.  Given  the existence  of law's two  faces,
the  surface  allure  of  Dworkin's  theory  lies  in  its  insistence  that
positive  law must be  understood  as  aspiring  to instantiate  a vision
of law  as it ought to be,  and that judges  not only can,  but should
and  must, strive  (within  the  limits  defined  by  the  requirement  of
"fit")  to bring the  "is"  and the "ought" into a relationship  of iden-
tity.  As I  have  suggested  already,  however, Dworkin's  effort to link
106  See  Gavison,  supra note  101,  at  1283.  But  see J.L.  Mackie,  Obligations to  Obey  the
Law, 67  VA.  L.  REV.  143  (1981)  (arguing  that,  although  a  general  obligation  to  obey  the
law  cannot  be  derived  from  any  plausible  moral  theory,  we  so  badly  need  such  an  obli-
gation for  reasons  of social  co6rdination  that we  should  "invent" one).
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positivism  and natural law  via a theory of legal interpretation  pres-
ents  us,  not with  the  two  clear  faces  of law,  but with  a confusing
amalgam.  The  confusion  is  most evident in  those  instances when,
by Dworkin's  own  account,  the  interpretation  that  is  morally best
is  nonetheless  one  that yields  unjust results."" When  this  occurs,
we  have  unjust  law  that  will,  on  Dworkin's  theory,  be  judicially
validated  as justified,  with  the  claim  of justification  confusingly
straddling  the domains  of the real  and  the ideal  across which  the
two  faces  of law respectively  look.
1 0 8
107  Se  supra text  accompanying  notes  97-100.  Dworkin  appears  to  insist  on  the  con-
ceptual  necessity  of a  link  between  the  two  faces  of  law,  with  interpretation  functioning
as  the  mediating  term.  His  argument,  if I  understand  it correctly,  unfolds  in  two  stages.
First,  law and  legal  practice are  interpretive  concepts,  and judges  must therefore  develop
their  own  interpretive  theories  of  what  obligations  the  practice  imposes  on  them.  See
JAW's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  50-52,  254-58.  Second,  given  the  nature  of interpretation,
the  best  interpretation  of every  legal  practice  requires  judges,  in  doubtful  cases,  to  base
their  results  at least  partly  on  normative  grounds.  The  best  legal  theory,  which  correctly
identifies  the  law  in  every  case,  will  be  the  one  that  achieves  the  best  mixture  of "fit"
with  existing  legal  materials  and normative  attractiveness.  Id.
Regarding  this  argument,  the  testing  question  is whether  we  can  imagine  a  possible
legal  system  in  which  the  test  applied  by judges  to  determine  the validity  of legal  claims
does  not incorporate  a  criterion  of moral  truth  or attractiveness.  I  think  that we  can-a
system,  for  example,  in  which  the  rule  is  that  all  doubtful  claims should  be  resolved  in
favor  of the  defendant.  What  is  easier  to  imagine  is  a  system  in  which  the  applicable
adjudicative  principles  call  for  decisions  in  doubtful  cases  to  conform  to  conventional
morality-that  is,  to  accord  with  the  values  that  predominate  in  a  particular  soci-
ety-rather  than  to  what  is  defensible  in  light  of  objective  moral  principle.  If so,  the
applicable  test  would  rely  solely  on  social  fact,  not  on  moral  right,  and Dworkin's  claim
that  the  ultimate  test of legal validity  necessarily  includes  moral  truth  as  one  of  its  crite-
ria  cannot survive.
Dworkin  may  think that  he needs  to  claim  less., He  might intend  only  to  claim  that
every  imaginable  system  of legal  rules  requires  "constructive" interpretation,  which  blends
concerns  of fit with  "normative  attractiveness."  As  I  have  argued  above,  however,  it is  im-
plausible  to  think  that  the  conceptual  logic  of  law  somehow  requires  judges  to  adopt
what  Dworkin  calls  an  interpretive  attitude,  even  when  this  attitude  is  permissible.  Alter-
natively,  Dworkin  might  intend  that,  even  under  a  rule  such  as  that  suggested  above
(doubtful  cases  are  to  be  decided  in  accordance  with  conventional  morality),  questions
will  remain  about  (i)  which  cases  are  in  fact doubtful  and  (ii)  what  conventional  morality
is  or  requires and that  these  questions  cannot  be  resolved unless  a judge  adopts  an inter-
pretive  attitude  that  balances  descriptive  "fit" with  considerations  of normative  attractive-
ness.  Again,  however,  this  claim  seems  too  strong. It  is  imaginable,  at  least,  that judges
would pursue  purely  positive  or  descriptive  answers  to  the  unresolved  questions  as  far  as
human  nature permits, with  any  irreducibly  residual  influence  left to relatively  unreflective
sympathy,  empathy, prejudice,  and  taste.
108  See supra text following note  105. To  talk  of law's  two  faces  is of course  to  speak.
metaphorically,  but I  do  not know  how  to  make  my  point  other  than  by  metaphor. An-
other metaphor,  that  of Wittgenstein's  duck-rabbit-a  figure  that can  be seen  either  as  a
duck  or  as  a  rabbit-might  serve  as  well.  See  LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEwN,  PHILosoPHIcAL
INVESTIGATIONS  194  (G.M.E.  Anscombe  trans.,  3d ed.  1976).  Although  we  can  see  the
figure  as  either a  duck  or as  a  rabbit,  it  would  be  very  misleading  to  say  that  the  figure
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B.  Is There a Duty  to  Obey?
Dworkin's  contrary  suggestion  notwithstanding,  recognizing
that the concept  of law  has  two  distinct aspects helps  to clarify  the
relationship  between  legal  duties  and  moral  duties.  More  particu-
larly,  this recognition  helps  to explain  why it is natural but errone-
ous  to believe  that there  is,  at  least in  reasonably just  regimes,  a
"general" moral  obligation  to  obey the  law."°
First, recognizing  law's  two  faces  helps to explain  why  there  is
likely to be a  very substantial  overlap  between  the positive  law and
the  prevailing  moral  beliefs  in  any  particular  society.  Both  serve
similar  interests  in  minimizing  conflict  and  facilitating  communal
life." 0  In  addition,  deep  psychological  and  sociological  forces
press  in  favor of "legitimating" explanations  of the external  world,
including  institutions,  such  as  the  law,  that  are  socially  construct-
ed.'  If  too  great  a dissonance  exists  between  what  the  law  com-
mands  and what  is  believed  to  be  reasonably just, the  situation  is
likely  to  be  unstable;  it  may  even  be  pathological.  Nevertheless,
recognizing  the  likelihood  of  overlap  between  law  and  morals  is
far from  asserting  the existence  of a  particular,  discretely  identifi-
able,  conceptual  connection  between  the  two.  Although  it  is  pre-
dictable  that  there  will  be  substantial  connections  between  what
the  law  in  a  given  society  happens  to  be  and  what  the  people  of
is  a  combination  of a  duck  and  a  rabbit.  So  it  is with  law.  We  can  see  law  as  externally
given  and  potentially  coercive-a  matter  of social  fact. But  much  of the  time,  as  unalien-
ated  citizens  of a  reasonably just  society,  we  may  see  the  law  as  typically  furnishing  rea-
sons  for  action  that sound  in  moral  terms.  Cf  infra notes  109-14  and  accompanying  text
(discussing whether  there  is  a  general  moral  obligation  to  obey  the  law of reasonably just
regimes).  Indeed,  this  may  be  such  a  familiar  aspect  of  our  experience  that  we  would
find  something  seriously  amiss,  even  conceptually  problematic,  about  a  body  of coercive
rules that  purported  to  be  law  but  that  provoked  in  us  a  sense  of  moral  outrage  or
alienation.  Nonetheless,  although  law  may  appear  to  us  in  these  very  different  ways,  it
would  be fundamentally  misleading  to  say  that law  was  some  mixture  or amalgamation  of
potentially  coercive  social  facts  and  freely  embraced  moral  norms.  Rather,  law  is  a  phe-
nomenon  that  sometimes  appears  to  us in  each  of the  two  ways,  and  our understanding
is  best  expressed  by  recognizing  the  duality,  not  by  insisting  on  a  conceptual  unity  that
demands some  form  of blurring,  blending,  or amalgamation.
109  The  insistence  on  generality  is  crucial,  since  there  are  likely  to  be  good  moral
reasons  to  obey  particular  laws  under  virtually  any  regime.  The  testing  question  must
therefore  be  whether  the  fact  of  legal  obligation  furnishes  a  moral  reason  to  do  what
the  law  requires  even  in  cases  in  which  no  other  moral  reason  would  exist.  For  a  useful
discussion  of  how  to  sort  out  this  and  related  issues,  see  KENT  GREENAWALT,  CONFLICTS
OF  LAW  AND  MoRALTrrY  47-203  (1987).
110  See,  e.g.,  HART,  supra note  3.
111  See  BERGER  &  LUCKMANN,  supra  note  73,  at  60-61;  LERNER,  supra  note  104.
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that society  believe  is  morally justifiable,  the  precise  nature  of the
connections  is sociologically  variable.
In  turn,  the  familiar  (but  not  invariable)  overlap  between
conventional  morality  and  substantive  law  helps  to  explain  why
most citizens  of most regimes will  tend  to view  the  law  as reason-
ably just. Moreover,  if citizens  tend  to regard the  law  as reasonably
just,  then  it  may  seem  natural,  under  a  variety  of -theories, to
think  that  there  must  be  a  generally  applicable  reason  to
obey."
2
In my view, however, there  is no  "general" moral obligation to
obey  the  law."'  This,  I  should  hasten  to  say,  is  a  conclusion  of
limited  practical  relevance."4  There  often  are  strong  moral  rea-
sons  to  do what  is  commanded  by  particular  laws,  many of which
only  prescribe  *that which  would  be  morally  right  or  forbid  that
which  would  be  morally  wrong  anyway."5  In  addition,  I  am  in-
clined  to accept  the idea of a moral  obligation  to  support reason-
ably just  systems  of social  cooperation  among  relevant  groups." 6
Laws  frequently  are  instrumental  in  establishing  such  systems  of
cooperation-schemes  in which  everyone  drives  on one side  of the
road  and  supports  the  provision  of  public  goods,  for  example.
Nonet heless,  the  role  of  law  in  such  cases  is  instrumental,  not
intrinsic. The  same  obligation  of support would  arise  if the  coop-
112  For  critical  surveys  of such  theories,  see,  ag.,  GREENAWALT,  supra note  109;  RAZ,
supra note  76;  Mackie,  supra note  106.
113  See supra note  109  (discussing  the  significance  of the  "generality"  requirement).  In
reaching  this  conclusion,  I  am  generally  persuaded  by  the  arguments  offered  in  RAZ,
supra note  76, at 233-49.  Raz  proceeds  largely  by dismissing  familiar arguments  purporting
to establish  an  obligation  to  obey. He argues,  for example,  that law-breaking  is  not neces-
sarily  bad  on  the  ground  that  it sets  a  bad  example;  sometimes  there  will  be  no  exam-
ple,  or  the  example  may, be  good.  Id.  at  237-38.  Arguments  based  on  contract  fail  be-
cause  there  is  nothing  in  the  lives  of  most  citizens  that  could  constitute  even  a  tacit
promise  to  obey.  Id. at  238-39.  Nor  are  most  citizens  estopped  across-the-board  from
breaking  the  law  as  a  result  of holding  themselves  out as  generally  law-abiding;  an estop-
pei argument  would  work  only  in  cases  involving  detrimental  effect  as  a  result  of actual
reliance. Id. Arguments  based  on  asserted  duties  to uphold just institutions and to  respect
principles  of fair  play  or  fair reciprocation  are  discussed  below,  see  infra text accompany-
ing  notes  118-19.
114  Among  other  things,  this  conclusion  does  not  imply  that  the  governments  of
reasonably just regimes  lack  legitimate  authority  to  govern;  the  questions  of legitimate  au-
thority  to  govern  and  citizens'  obligations  to  obey  are  distinct.  See Rolf Sartorius, Political
Atlwrity and Political Obligati'n, 67 VA.  L.  REV.  3  (1981).
115  See  eg., RAZ,  supra note  76, at  233-49.
116  The  leading  effort  to  define  and justify  such  a  duty, albeit  not  one  that  I agree
with  in  all  respects, is JOHN  RAWLs,  A  THEORY OF JUsTIcE  333-91  (1971).
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erative  scheme  arose  voluntarily  or  through  extra-legal  conven-
tion."
7
More  importantly,  the  obligation  to  support just  institutions,
as I would  construe  it, does not extend  to  cases in which individu-
al  action  and  inaction,  if  generally  engaged  in,  would  have  no
adverse  consequences  for  the  institutions  involved. 11   The  obliga-
tion  to support just institutions  is  simply not implicated, for exam-
ple,  if I  roll  through  rather  than  coming  to  a  full stop  at a  stop
sign  at  a  deserted  intersection,  or  if,  after  stopping,  I  drive
through  a red light on an  empty street at 3  a.m.
These  examples  may,  of course,  seem  trivial. What  is  really  at
stake,  it might be  argued,  is  not  so  much  an instrumental  obliga-
tion  of support  but  a noninstrumental, notion  of reciprocation  or
"fair  play,"119 which  requires  those  who  benefit from  others'  obe-
dience  to  a  reasonably  just  system  of  laws  to  accord  the  same
benefit  to  others.  To  my  mind,  however,  any  noninstrumental
obligation  of obedience  could  attach  only  to  laws  that were  good
in themselves,  not to every law just in virtue  of its being a law of a
reasonably just regime.  Consider  the  laws  of  otherwise  reasonably
just  regimes  that  regulate  private  religious  or  consensual  sexual
practices  that  (in  my view)  ought, as  a moral  matter,  to be  left to
individual  conscience  or  choice.  In  confronting  laws  that  offer
seemingly  disagreeable  prescriptions,  the  conscientious  citizen
should perhaps  ponder carefully whether the  moral judgment that
the  community  has  embodied  in  law  might  not be  better  consid-
ered  than  her  own.120  If she judges  that it  is  not,  however,  I  see
no  noninstrumental  moral  obligation  of  compliance1-not
117  See  A.D.  WOOZLEY,  LAW  AND  OBEDIENCE:  THE  ARGUMENTS  OF  PLATO'S  CRrro  73
(1979):
Whatever  there  is  to  be  said  for  such  a  law  is  whatever  there  is  to  be  said for
the  practice  which  the  law  requires;  and  the  reason  for  acting  in  accordance
with  the  law,  or  for  conforming  one's  conduct  to  it,  lies  in  the  value  of  the
practice. The  practice  derives  none  of its  value  from  the  law,  and  [just  because]
it is  the  law  provides  no  reason  for  conformity  ....
Id.
118  See  GREENAWALT,  supra note  109.
119  See,  e.g.,  H.L.A.  Hart,  Are  There  Any  Natural Rights?,  64  PHIL  REv.  175  (1955);
John  Rawls,  Legal Obligations and the  Duty  of Fair Play, in  AW  AND  PHILOSOPHY  3  (Sidney
Hook  ed.,  1964).
120  See,  e.g.,  SCHAUER,  supra note  36,  at  125;  cf. Heidi  Hurd,  Challenging  Authority,  100
YALE  L.J.  1611  (1991)  (arguing  that  the  authority  of law  is  "theoretical"  rather than  prac-
tical);  Donald  H.  Regan,  Reasons, Authority,  and the  Meaning of "Obey",  3  CAN.  J.L. & JUR.
3,  3-11  (1990)  (arguing  that  law  provides  "indicative"  rather  than  "intrinsic"  reasons  for
compliance).
121  Throughout  this  discussion,  I  mean  to  put  aside  the  possibility  of  instrumental
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even,  as  proponents  of the  position  would  argue,  an  obligation
susceptible  of  being  overcome  by  competing  moral  consider-
ations. 1 22  It may  be  hard  to  find  a  moral  duty  to  engage  in  pro-
scribed  forms  of  sexual  conduct;12   but  where  there  are  no  ad-
verse  consequences  implicating  a  moral  obligation  of support  for
the law, the existence  of a general moral  right to engage in legally
forbidden  behavior  will often  be dispositive  of whether there  is  an
all-things-considered  moral  duty  to  obey. 1 2 4  No  "general"  obliga-
tion  to obey the  law need figure in  the calculus.' I
If we  are inclined  to think  that there  is  a general  moral  obli-
gation  to  obey  the  law,  applicable  even  to  cases  involving  traffic
regulations  on visibly deserted  streets  and the regulation  of private
sexual  conduct, at least  part of the  explanation  may  be  that law's
moral face  encourages  us to associate  law with that which is  moral-
ly  right  and  therefore  to  equate  legal  duty  with  moiral  duty.
12
harms to  a  reasonably just  regime  of law-harns  that  might  be  present  in  some,  but
surely not in  all,  cases.
122  See  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  110-13,  191,  202-06.
123  This  is  not to suggest  that morality  is  exclusively  or  even  primarily  bound up with
the  concept  of duty.  "Moral"  reasons  may  well  exist  for engaging  in  sexual  activity-that
is,  reasons  rooted  in  a  conception  of the  kind  of life  that  is  morally  healthy or  good.
124  Among  the  possible  complicating  factors,  perhaps  the  most  interesting  is Joseph
Raz's  suggestion  that  conscientious  citizens  whose  sense  of personal  identity  is  linked  to
their  membership  in  a  reasonably just society  may  have  moral  reasons,  possibly rising  to
the  level  of a moral  duty,  to  express  their  respect  for  the  society  through  obedience  to
its  laws.  Se  RAZ,  supra note  76, at 250-61.  Although  not persuaded  by  Raz's  analysis  in  all
respects  (among  other  things, framing  the  conclusion  in  the  language  of "duty" seems  to
me  to  be  misleading),  I  agree  that self-identification  with,  and respect  for,  one's  society
can  generate  reasons,  including  moral  reasons,  to  obey  the  society's  laws,  even  when  the
underlying  psychological  attitude  is  not itself  morally  required.  Socrates'  acceptance  of a
punishment  of death, see PLATO,  Crito, in THE  COLLECTED  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO  27  (Edith
Hamilton  & Huritington  Calras eds.,  1961),  arguably  exemplifies both  the  attitude  that  I
have  in  mind  and  the  kinds  of reasons  with  which  that  attitude  may  be  associated.  But
see  Frances  Olsen,  Socr'ate  on  Legal  Obligation.. Legitimation  Theory  and  Civil Disobedience  18
GA.  L.  REV.  929  (1984)  (arguing  that Socrates  accepted  death  by  refusing to  escape,  not
to  show  his  respect  for  the  laws  of Athens,  but  to  provide  a  vivid  example  of, the  laws'
injustice).
125  Judges constitute  a special case  in a  double  sense.  First,,judges  commonly promise
to  obey  the  law as  a  condition  of assuming  judicial  office.  Second,  in  order  for  law  to
fulfill  its  basic  purposes,  "it must  be  possible  to  regard  the  activity  of  law  applying  as
governed  by  some  reasonably  coherent  pattern,"  Postemua,  supra note  55,  at  176,  and  the
requisite  coherence  might well  be  impossible  if judges did  not follow  established  interpre-
tive  conventions.
126  Cf.  Sartorius,  supra  note  114,  at  16  ("Within  a just  society,  the  general  pattern  of
compliance  with  what  the  law  requires  would  be  voluntay in  the  sense  that  the  normal
motive for  obedience  would  not be  the  fear  of legal  sanctions  but  rather  the  belief  that
what  the  law  required  was  right independent  of the  fact  that  the  law  required  iL").  Pro-
fessor Lyons  apparently  agrees,  but reasons  to  the  very  different conclusion  that the  only
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But this,  as I  have suggested,  is  a  mistake  insofar  as  the term  "le-
gal"  refers  to  law's  positivist  face.  The  magistrate  may  find  a
breach  of legal  duty in  the  cases  I have  hypothesized.  Depending
on  the  prevailing  interpretive  conventions,  her  legal  analysis  may
be correct.  Nevertheless,  there  will be  no  breach  of a  moral duty,
or even a moral requirement  of competing  moral  reasons to justify
disobedience,  because  there  is  no  general  moral  obligation  to
obey positive  law.
127
V.  CONVENTIONALISM
In Law's Empire, Dworkin  distinguishes  between  his  formal  or
meta-theory,  which  claims  that  "law  is  an  interpretive  concept,  "128
and  his  substantive  interpretation,  which  he  styles  "law  as  integri-
ty."'  It  is  an  entailment  of law  as  integrity  that  the  law  in  any
particular  case  is  that result  which  emerges  from  the  theory  that
portrays  the  past political  decisions  of a  regime  in  the  best,  most
consistent  light.  Dworkin  defends  this  substantive  theory  partly  by
arguing  its  superiority  to  "conventionalism," 13  which  is  substan-
tially  an  improved,  modernized  version  of  Hart's  positivism.1 T M
morally  and  theoretically  defensible  conception  of  legal  justification  would  be  one  that
equated  legal justification  with moral justification.  See  David Lyons, Jusitfcation and  Judicial
Resonsibility, 72  CA_  L.  REV.  178,  193-99  (1984).  Lyons's  reasoning  leads  to  an  implica-
tion, which  seems  to  me  unsustainable,  that  an  "unjust law"  is  not  really law at  all.
127  To  say  that  there  is  no  general  moral  obligation  to  obey  the  law  is  by  no  means
to  imply  that law  fails  in  its  aspiration  to  guide  conduct  by  providing  reasons  for  action
in  many,  if  not  most,  cases  in  which  the  law of a  reasonably just  regime  applies.  For the
law of reasonably just  regimes  will  typically  provide  what  Professor  Regan  has  classified  as
"indicative" reasons  for  obeyance.  In  other  words, law's  being what  it  is  will  tend  to indi-
cate  the  existence  of some  further fact  of intrinsic  moral  relevance.  See  Regan,  supra note
120,  at  3-11.  The  indicated  fact  might  be  that  particular  conduct  is  morally  wrong  or
offensive  to  other  citizens  (where  this  is  the  judgment  that  relevant  officials  have
reached)  or  that  solutions  to  coordination  problems  (such  as  the  problem  of  getting
everyone  to  drive  on  either  the  left  or  the  right)  can  realistically  be  achieved  only  on
the  terms  indicated  by  law.  Indeed,  the  reason-fumishing  significance  of  law  is  so  great
with  respect  to  coordination  problems,  see  Postema,  supra note  55,  that  the  difference
between  saying  there  is  a  moral  obligation  to  support  the  reasonably just  scheme  of  so-
cial  cooperation  established  by law  and saying  that  there  is  an  obligation  to  obey the  law
as law  may  sometimes  be  so  thin  as  to  border  on  being  artificial.  See  Mackie,  supra note
106,  at  150.
128  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  50.
129  Id.  at  225.
130  &e  id. at  114-50.
131  See  id. at  115-16.  Dworkin  dismisses  "positivism"  in  the  early  part of LAW'S  EMPIRE
as  a  "semantic"  theory  of  law  that,  he  says,  fails  in  principle  because  debate  over  what
"law"  is  is  not  plausibly  a  debate  about  the  semantic  rules  governing  the  use  of the word
"law."  Instead  of being semantic,  as  he  claims  positivism  is, Dworkin  thinks  a good  theory
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Among conventionalism's improvements  over positivism  is its avoid-
ance of misleading  connotations  that law  is  necessarily  posited  or
commanded  by some identifiable  sovereign  entity.  By contrast,  the
label  "conventionalism"  suggests  that the foundations  of law  lie in
the kind of social situation  in which  conventions  tend  to develop:
"[C]onventions  are  not  mere  regularities  of behavior but, rather,
regularities  arising  out of and reinforcing  a  system  of mutual  ex-
pectations  and a commonly recognized need for coordinated  activi-
ty."132  Within  the  terms  of this  definition,  many  legal  rules  or in-
terpretive  practices  are  conventions  in  the  technical  sense:  they
reflect  a  response  to  situations  in  which,  unless  coordination  is
achieved, widely shared  moral  or practical interests  will be frustrat-
ed, and  in which  it may be  more  important  that there should  be
some  coordinating  convention  than  that  the  convention  should
have  a  particular  content. 1 3  To  take  a  familiar  example,  it  is
more important that everyone  should drive on  the right or on  the
left than  that it be either  the  right or  the left on which  everyone
of  law  must be  "interpretive"  in  the  sense  described  above.  See  supra Part  III.  "Conven-
tionalism,"  in  Dworkin's  usage,  is  an  interpretive  theory  that  incorporates  most  of  the
substantive  features  of "positivism." There  is  one  possibly  significant  difference.  Consistent
with  his  own  generally  "adjudicavist"  approach  to  the  concept  of  law,  see  Stephen  -R.
Perry,  Second-Order Reasons,  Uncertainty and Legal Tlory, 62  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  913,  958-59
(1989),  Dworkin  conceives  the point or function  of law under a  conventionalist  theory  to
be  one  of providing  fair warning  of legal  consequences  and  protecting  reasonable  expec-
tations.  See  LAW's EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 95,  117.  Under  traditional  positivist approach-
es,  the  function  of  law  is  more  centrally  one  of guiding  behavior  by  providing  reasons
for  action.  See,  eg.,  RAZ,  supra note  76,  at  50-51;  Perry,  supra, at  950-62;  Postema,  supra
note  55,  at  187-88.  I  shall  use  the  term  "conventionalism"  more  or  less  interchangeably
with  "positivism" without  endorsing  Dworkin's  ascription  of purpose.
Dworkin  also  discusses  "pragmatism"  as  a  second  rival  to  his  own  theory.
"Pragmatism,"  as  defined  by Dworkin,  holds  that judges  are  free  to  decide  cases  however
they  choose  but  that judges  characteristically  should  and  do  decide  cases  in  ways  that
promote  the  society's  values  and  policy  interests.  See  LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra  note  1,  at  72,
147-49,  151-53.  I  have  serious  doubts  about  this  account  of  a  pragmatist  theory  of  law.
Like" Dworkin's  own  theory,  legal  pragmatism  as  described  by  him  seems  more  a  theory
of adjudication  than  a  theory  of law.  Pragmatism,  as  he  portrays  it,  cannot  account  for
how law  operates  in  social  life  outside  the  courts  or for why judicial  decisions  should  be
taken  as  authoritative.  For  these  purposes,  some  account  rooted  in  social  fact  remains
needed.  It  is  also unclear  how  Dworkin's  "pragmatism"  maps  onto  that of the  apparently
burgeoning  school of self-styled  legal  pragmatists,  whose  views  are  vastly more  diverse  and
complex  than  Dworkin's  ideal  type  would  suggest.  See  e.g.,  RICHARD  POSNER,  THE  PROB-
LEMS  OF JURISPRUDENCE  (1990);  Daniel  A.  Farber,  Legal Pragmatism and the  Constitution, 72
MINN.  L.  REV.  1381  (1981);  Symposium  on  the  Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal
Thought,  63  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1569  (1990).
132  Postema,  supra note  55,  at  176.  The  undoubted  inspiration  for  modem  conven-
tional  theories  of law  is  DAVID  LEWIS,  CONVENTION:  A  PHILOSOPHICAL  STUDY  (1969).
133  See Postema,  supra note  55,  at  199.
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drives.  Having  suggested  my  sympathy  with  a  conventionalist  ap-
proach  to  the  study  of  law,  I  want  briefly  to  address  Dworkin's
opposing arguments.
A. , Dworkin's Attack
Conventionalism,  as  defined by Dworkin,  follows  Hart in  root-
ing  law  in  the  facts  of existing  practices,  social  rules,  or  conven-
tions.M  According  to  conventionalism,  law  consists  of  conven-
tions  or other precepts  that reflect widely  shared  agreement  about
the  existence  or  nonexistence  of  legal  duties,  including  conven-
tions  governing  the  practice  of  legal  interpretation.  Dworkin's
chief  claim  against  conventionalism  is  that  it cannot  account  for
judicial  decisionmaking  in  hard  cases  or,  more  generally,  for  dis-
agreement  in  law:  if the  governing  conventions  are  valid  only in
virtue  of being  accepted  as  such,  how  can  we  explain  the familiar
kinds  of disagreement  among judges  and  lawyers  about  What  the
relevant  conventions  are  and  about  how  they  apply  in  particular
cases?'
s5
Having knocked  down conventionalism  as a view that treats  all
legal  questions  as  questions  of fact  about  the  existence  and  rele-
vance  of legal  rules,  Dworkin  briefly  introduces  a  second  version
of  conventionalism,  which  he  labels  "soft  conventionalism." 136
Soft conventionalism  adopts  the  positivist  tenets  that the  existence
and  validity of law  are  matters  of social  fact  and  that there  is  no
strong,  conceptual  connection  between  law  and  morals. 3 7  But
soft conventionalism  departs from  the  "harder" variety in recogniz-
ing  that,  as  a  matter  of  contingent  fact,  the  conventions  of  any
particular  legal  system  may  specify  some  form  of appeal  to  moral
principles  as  the  appropriate  means  of dispute  resolution  in  cases
in  which  the  more  narrowly  legal  materials,  understood  in  the
conventional  ways  (which  may  be  more  or  less  determinate),  fail
to  provide  a  uniquely  correct  answer.  Because  many  of the  rele-
vant rules or conventions  may be vague or conflicted,  and because
the interpretive  exercise  necessary  to resolve  doubtful  cases  may be
134  See  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  114-17;  see  also Postema,  supra note  55,  at  166-
67  (characterizing  the  rule  of recognition  that  provides  the  foundation  for  Hart's  theory
of law  as  a  "convention").
135  See  LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at  126-39.
136  Id at  124-30.  For  examples  of other  theories  that  would  fit  the  description,  see,
e.g., Jules  L.  Coleman,  Negative  and Positive Positivism,  11  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  139  (1982);  David
Lyons,  Principles,  Positivism  and Legal  Theoly,  87  YALE  LJ. 415  (1977).
137  See  supra note  103.
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contestable,  soft conventionalism  can  explain  why judges will  pre-
dictably  diverge  in  their judgments  about  how  cases  should  be
decided  and  about what factors judges  should  rely on  in  deciding
cases.  Yet,  as  Professor  Coleman  has  put  it,  "[t]he  controversy
among judges  does  not arise  over  the  content of the  [convention
prescribing  reference  to  principles  or  policy  goals].  It  arises  over
which  norms  satisfy  the  standards  set  forth  in  [that  conven-
tion].,,"s8
B.  The  Virtues of "Soft Conventionalism"
Soft conventionalism  is  unlikely  to  satisfy  anyone's  notions  of
theoretical  elegance."9  It  is  something  of  a  makeshift,  founded
on the view  that law  must be  rooted  in social  fact, but adapted  to
accommodate  three  plain  truths  emphasized  by  Dworkin.  First,
judges  and  lawyers  frequently  write  and  argue  as  if there  were
more  law than can  be accounted for by any theory that makes  the
existence  of uniquely  correct  outcomes,  rules,  or  conventions  de-
pend  on  virtual  consensus  in  factual  judgment.  Second,  in  the
American  context  at least,  the phenomena  of legal  evolution  and
change  can  be  explained  only by recognizing  that judicial reason-
ing  frequently  has  a  "political"  aspect  that  is  related  by  family
resemblance  to,  yet  is  distinct  from,  many  other  forms  of
decisionmaking  familiarly  characterized  as  "political."4 °  Third,
there  is  no recognized  distinction in our legal practice  between  an
aspect  of judicial  reasoning  aimed  at  discovering  the  law  and  an
aspect  that  is  aimed,  after  the  law  is  determined,  at filling  identi-
fied  gaps  or  implementing  reforms.  I  had  these  insights  in  mind
when,  at the outset, I  termed Dworkin's  theoretical  efforts  "deeply
instructive."
Soft  conventionalism,  however,  can  embrace  these  insights,
while  at  the  same  time  explaining  in  a  way  that  Dworkin's  own
theory does  not how  law  is  rooted in  social  fact. In addition,  with-
in  the  American  system  at least,  soft  conventionalism  provides  a
plausible  account  of how  ideology  and  moral  argument  can  per-
138  Coleman,  supra note  136,  at  156.
139  See,  eg.,  Kent  Greenawalt,  The Rule of Recognition and the  Constitution, 85  MICH.  L.
REV.  621,  667-68  (1987).
140  On  different  senses  of  "political" and  their  relevance  to  analysis  of judicial  deci-
sionmaking,  see  Richard  Hodder-Williams,  Six  Notions  of  "Political" and  the  United  States
Supreme  Court, 22  BRIT.  J.  POL.  Scl. 1  (1992);  Richard H.  Fallon, Jr.,  Common Law  Court or
Council of Redsion?, 101  YALE  LJ. 949,  960-61  (1992) (book review).
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meate  legal  debate  while  at the  same  time  playing  a  subordinate
role  limited by  the  facts of social  practice.
To  see  that the  role  of morals  is  subordinate,  and  restricted
by  convention,  it suffices  to  keep  two  points  in  mind.  First,  con-
ventions  do  far  more  work  than  sophisticated  debate  frequently
imagines,  often  by  defining  the  realm  of the  legally  unthinkable.
Within  our practice, for example,  it is simply  unimaginable-there
are  no  plausible  legal  arguments  holding-that  the  first  amend-
ment forbids  me to  yawn  or that the Koran  is  the  law of the  Unit-
ed  States. 141  Second,  the  moral  arguments  that  count  as  legal  ar-
guments  are  restricted  by  the  rules  or  conventions  (and  in  some
cases  by virtually unanimously  acknowledged  rules  or  conventions)
of  our  legal  practice.  "It is  God's  will"  is  not  a  legal  argument
within our  practice,  because  the  governing conventions  rule it out
of  bounds,  even  though  the  governing  conventions  do  not  rule
other  moral  arguments  about  fairness  and  efficiency  similarly out
of bounds. In  other words,  a partial  separation  exists  between  law
and morals in our practice;  and the  question  of which  moral  argu-
ments  also  count  as  legal  arguments  is  one  that  can  only  be  an-
swered  by reference  to  social  fact.  A judge  or  lawyer  may  dismiss
an argument  based  on  God's will as  legally irrelevant,  not because
she  believes  that  there  is  no  God  or  that  God's  will  cannot  be
known,  but simply  because  the  rules  or conventions  of legal prac-
tice provide  an  authoritative  legal  reason for refusing  to take  theo-
logical  morals  into account.
VI.  CONCLUSION:  DwoRKIN  AND
"SoF  CONvENTIoNALIsM"
In  Law's  Empire, Dworkin  does  not  attempt  to  refute  "soft
conventionalism"  directly.  Instead,  he  tries  to  subsume  it  as  an
"underdeveloped  form"  of  his  own  theory." 4  In  my  view,  howev-
er, Dworkin  has matters  almost precisely  backwards.  As  I  have  sug-
gested  above,  his  theory  lacks  a  sufficiently  rich  account  of the
nature of a legal  system, and of how law functions  in everyday  life,
to  stand  as  a  comprehensive  theory  of law  in  the  same  sense  as
Hart's  theory,  for example.  Furthermore,  Dworkin's  claim  that  all
judges  must  always  attempt  to  portray  existing  legal  materials  in
141  For  forceful  expressions  of  similar  points,  see  Ken  Kress,  Legal Indeterminacy,  77
CAi.  L.  REV.  283  (1989);  Lawrence  B.  Solumn,  On tie  Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing  Critlcal
Dogma, 54  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  462,  470-73  (1987).
142  See LAw's  EMPIRE,  supra note  1,  at 127-28.
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the  best  moral  light  is  implausible.  To  put  the  point  sharply,
Dworkin  is  least illuminiting when  talking about what  "law" is  as  a
general  or  conceptual  matter;  he  is most illuminating  (even if not
always  entirely  persuasive)  when  talking  about  how  anyone-and
especially judges-should  identify what  "the  law"  is  in  the  special
context  of the  English  and American  legal  systems. Nor,  I  hasten
to  add,  should  this  characterization  be  regarded  as  in  any  way
trivializing  Dworkin's  enterprise.  Though  broader  in  compass,  the
question  "what  is  law?"  does  not  necessarily  have  greater  philo-
sophical  depth  or  practical  importance  than  more  local  questions
about  what  the  law  is  or  whether  particular  laws  ought  to  be
obeyed.
By  contrast  with  Dworkin's  theory,  soft  conventionalism  is  a
theory  of law  in  the  traditional  sense.  A  soft  conventionalist  can
follow  Hart  in  recognizing  that  law  is  grounded  in  the  facts  of
actual  social  practice.  But  soft  conventionalism  can  also,  as
Dworkin  acknowledges,  accept  the  possibility  that  the  reigning
conventions  (or what Hart  has  called  the  rule  of recognition)  in
certain  legal  systems-such  as  those  of  England  and  the  United
States-might  put judges  under  a  conventional  or  social  duty  to
resolve  controversial  questions,  including  questions  about  the  rule
of recognition  itself, by application  of interpretive  techniques  that
may  sometimes  include  appeal  to  moral  principle.  If  this  is  so,
someone  holding  a  conventionalist  theory  might  accept  or  incor-
porate Dworkin's  theory as the best account of how judges  do and
should decide  cases in the  English and American  systems-though
she would  not, have  to,  since  rival  accounts  that are  equally  com-
patible with conventionalism  are  also  available. 4'
143  For  example,  my  own  thoroughly  conventionalist  theory  of constitutional  inter-
pretation,  though  much  influenced  by  Dworkin,  departs  from  his  theory  in  important
respects.  See  Fallon,  supra note  18,  at  1233-37  & nn.206,  213.
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